Say the ratio out loud before you open Reasoning — recalling it unprompted is exactly what the exam pays for.
Why this pair matters
The second great matched pair of homicide — two mothers, each jumping into a well with a child, one guilty of culpable homicide and one of murder. The variable this time is the last five words of clause (d): "without any excuse for incurring the risk." Dhirajia had an excuse; Gyarsibai did not. Learn them as a set with Palani/Thavamani: same technique, different clause.
Dhirajia — facts and holding
Dhirajia, a young woman of 20, was unhappily married to Jhagga, who did not treat her well. After a quarrel in which he threatened to beat her, she set out before dawn with her six-month-old baby, wanting to reach her parents. Jhagga woke, found them gone, and pursued her. When she heard him behind her, she turned in a panic, ran a short way, and jumped or fell into an open well. The baby died; she survived.
Held: not murder — culpable homicide under s. 304 (s. 300(4) not made out). Braund J: "We must consider in assessing what is excuse or is not excuse the state of mind she was in. She feared her husband and she had reason to fear her husband. … in the panic into which she was thrown when she saw him behind her she jumped into the well. We think she had excuse and that that excuse was panic or fright." The knowledge of imminent danger was present, but the clause's own escape hatch — an excuse for running the risk — was open, so the killing dropped out of murder.
Gyarsibai — facts and holding
Gyarsibai lived with constant quarrels between herself and her sister-in-law, Kaisar Bai; her husband would slap her for the quarrelling. After one such quarrel, Kaisar Bai told her to leave the house. She left, announcing that on account of her sister-in-law she would jump into a well, went to a village well, and threw herself in together with her three children (aged 7, 5 and 1½). She was found clinging to the edge; all three children were dead.
Held: murder. Dixit J confronted Dhirajia directly and distinguished it. The test of excuse is not purely subjective: "we must take into account the state of mind of a reasonable and legally sane person and then determine whether the risk of causing death could have been avoided. On this test, there can be no room for thinking … the appellant was justified in jumping into a well with her three children merely on account of her sister-in-law's attitude." Crucially, "here there is no question of any panic or fright" — she had declared her intention in advance and walked deliberately to the well. Knowledge of an imminently dangerous act, and no excuse, is murder under clause (d).
The ratio, side by side
| | Dhirajia | Gyarsibai | |---|---|---| | Act | jumps into well with baby | jumps into well with three children | | Knowledge of imminent danger | present | present | | State of mind | sudden panic, fleeing a feared husband | deliberate, announced in advance | | "Excuse" under clause (d) | yes — fright/panic | no — a domestic quarrel is no excuse | | Result | culpable homicide (s. 304) | murder (s. 302) |
The doctrine: clause (d)/s. 101(d) turns on the last phrase. Knowledge of imminent danger converts to murder only where the risk was run without excuse — and excuse is measured against a reasonable person, so genuine sudden panic can save, but grievance and deliberation cannot.
Under the BNS
Clause "fourthly" is enacted verbatim as s. 101(d), "without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death" intact. Punishment: murder under s. 103(1); the Dhirajia outcome falls to s. 105. Note the doctrinal link back to Unit 4: the "excuse" here is a clause-internal qualifier, distinct from the Chapter III general exceptions — a point examiners probe.
In the app
The analysis continues in the app with Exam use — how to write this case into an answer and Viva use — how to speak to it in a viva, plus every card and question built on this case.