K.N. Mehra v State of Rajasthan (1957)

Theft (Unit 12) turns on the five elements of s. 303, and the slipperiest is "dishonestly." Mehra — the case of the cadets who flew off in an air-force plane — settles that a permanent intention to deprive is not required: temporary, unauthorised taking with wrongful gain is enough. It pairs with Pyare Lal Bhargava (the file removed for a day) on the very same point.

Mehra and Phillips were cadets under training at the Indian Air Force Academy, Jodhpur; Phillips had been discharged for misconduct. On the morning of 14 May 1952, before the discharge could bite, the two took off in a Harvard aircraft without authorisation — a plane meant for training flights, taken out of turn and without permission — and flew to Pakistan, landing about 100 miles across the border. They were convicted of theft under IPC s. 379.

1. Was there dishonest intention, given they may have meant to use the aircraft only temporarily?
2. Was the taking without consent — could training-flight authorisation imply consent to this flight?

Conviction affirmed. The Court read IPC s. 378's definition strictly: "whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, commits theft." (IPC s. 378 is the ancestor of BNS s. 303.) Applying it:

• Dishonest intention needs no permanent deprivation. Wrongful gain (s. 23) is gain by unlawful means of property to which one is not entitled — and it includes temporary retention. Taking the aircraft out without authority, for their own unauthorised purpose, was a wrongful gain and a wrongful loss while it lasted; the intent to return it eventually is no defence.
• No consent. Authorisation for scheduled training flights did not imply consent to this unauthorised flight across an international border; the "implied consent" argument failed.

Dishonest intention in theft does not require an intention permanently to deprive — unauthorised temporary use, producing wrongful gain or wrongful loss, satisfies the mental element. Consent to one use is not consent to another. The offence is complete the moment the property is moved with that intent.

Theft is now s. 303, with "dishonestly" defined in s. 2(7) and wrongful gain/loss in s. 2(36)–(37) — all carried over intact, so Mehra applies unchanged. Pair it with Pyare Lal Bhargava v State of Rajasthan (the government clerk who removed a file for a day and returned it — still theft) as the two authorities that kill the "I meant to give it back" defence. Recall from Unit 3 that first-conviction petty theft can now draw community service (s. 303(2) proviso), but that is about sentence, not about whether theft was committed.