State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh (1996)

Unit 6's sexual-offence questions frequently ask how a rape charge is proved — and Gurmit Singh is the Supreme Court's corrective to the old habit of distrusting the victim. It supplies the "sterling witness" principle every answer on the trial of sexual offences should carry.

The prosecutrix, a schoolgirl below sixteen, was sitting her matriculation examinations. On 30 March 1984, walking from her examination centre to her uncle's house, she was forced into a car by three young men — Gurmit Singh, Jagjit Singh and Ranjit Singh — driven to a tube-well kotha, made to drink liquor by misrepresentation, and raped. The trial court acquitted, disbelieving her: it pointed to delay in the FIR, the possibility of false implication, and the absence of corroboration.

Whether the trial court was right to acquit for want of corroboration and on the "delay" reasoning — and, more broadly, how the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual-offence case is to be assessed.

Acquittal set aside; convictions restored. Dr Anand J laid down principles that reshaped sexual-offence trials:

• The testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence, needs no corroboration and can found a conviction on its own — she stands on a higher footing than an injured witness, not a lower one; corroboration is not "the sine qua non for conviction."
• Minor delay in lodging the FIR is understandable in sexual offences, given the stigma and family considerations, and is not by itself a ground to disbelieve.
• Courts must deal with such cases with sensitivity, must not disbelieve a victim for want of injuries or on stereotyped assumptions about how a victim "should" behave, and the trial must be conducted so as not to humiliate her.

A rape conviction may rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix where that testimony inspires confidence; corroboration is a rule of prudence, not law, and the absence of corroboration, of prompt FIR, or of injuries is not fatal. The victim is a witness for the prosecution deserving of the same credit as any other injured witness, judged by the ordinary standard of credibility.

Rape is now s. 64 (with the definition and the seven circumstances in s. 63, Unit 6). The evidentiary approach of Gurmit Singh is unchanged and, indeed, reinforced by the modern consent definition in Explanation 2 to s. 63 (an unequivocal voluntary agreement; absence of physical resistance is not consent). Cite Gurmit Singh whenever the question is how the charge is proved, not what it is.