Say the ratio out loud before you open Reasoning — recalling it unprompted is exactly what the exam pays for.
Why it matters
The 1986 Act was passed to undo Shah Bano. Danial Latifi is the case that decided what the Act means — and, by construing it to give the divorced wife a fair provision for her future, made the Act consistent with Shah Bano rather than its reversal. Every maintenance question in this paper ends here.
Background — Shah Bano
The Court restated Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum (1985): a wife married for 43 years, put out of the matrimonial home, granted Rs 25 a month by the Magistrate and Rs 179 by the High Court; her husband, an advocate, answered her petition under s. 125 CrPC by pronouncing a triple talaq and paying Rs 3,000 as deferred mahr and maintenance for the iddat period, and argued that his liability under Muslim law was discharged. The Supreme Court held she could claim under s. 125 after iddat. The 1986 Act followed.
Issue
Whether the 1986 Act, which by s. 3(1)(a) entitles a divorced woman to "a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband", confines the husband's liability to the iddat period — and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional under Articles 14, 15 and 21.
Held
Rajendra Babu J., for the Bench, read the section as a whole. The husband's obligation is to make, within the iddat period, a reasonable and fair provision for the wife's future as well as to pay her maintenance for that period; "within the iddat period" fixes when the provision must be made, not how long it must last. The Court's conclusions: (1) a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife, including her maintenance, and the provision must be made within the iddat period; (2) the liability "is not confined to the iddat period"; (3) a divorced woman who has not remarried and cannot maintain herself after iddat "can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives" who would inherit from her, in proportion to their shares, and if they cannot pay "the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board" to pay; (4) "the provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India". The writ petitions challenging the Act were dismissed.
The ratio, stated for an answer
- Under s. 3(1)(a) of the 1986 Act the husband must, within iddat, make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife's future; the liability is not limited to the iddat period.
- Section 4 supplies the fallback — relatives who would inherit from her, then the State Wakf Board — for the woman who cannot maintain herself after iddat.
- So read, the Act is constitutional.
In the app
The analysis continues in the app with Exam use — how to write this case into an answer and Viva use — how to speak to it in a viva, plus every card and question built on this case.
Related cases in this unit
- Rashid Ahmad v Anisa Khatun (Privy Council, 1932) — a triple talaq once pronounced is final, whatever the husband meant
- Shamim Ara v State of U.P. (Supreme Court, 2002) — a talaq must be pronounced, for a reason, after an attempt at reconciliation
- Shayara Bano v Union of India (Supreme Court, 2017) — talaq-e-biddat set aside
- Noor Saba Khatoon v Mohd. Quasim (Supreme Court, 1997) — the children's maintenance is their own, not capped at two years
- Yousuf Rawther v Sowramma (Kerala High Court, 1971) — failure to maintain as a breakdown ground, and khula as the wife's gateway
- Itwari v Asghari (Allahabad High Court, 1960) — there is no "Muslim cruelty"; a husband who takes a second wife must explain himself