Say the ratio out loud before you open Reasoning — recalling it unprompted is exactly what the exam pays for.
Why it matters
Two propositions from this case recur in the paper: that the husband's failure to maintain for two years is a ground in itself, whatever caused it, and that s. 2(ix) keeps alive the classical grounds — with khula described in words examiners like to see quoted.
Facts
Sowramma, a Hanafi girl of about fifteen, married Yusuf Rowthan, nearly twice her age, in 1962. They hardly lived together for more than a few days; after a long separation she sued for dissolution. The husband's case was that he had been willing and anxious to keep her but that she had wrongfully refused to return, at her father's instance, so that his not sending her money was not a "failure to maintain". By the time of the appeal he had taken another wife and she, on the decree granted in appeal, had remarried — facts Krishna Iyer J. noted as making reconciliation impossible.
Issue
Whether s. 2(ii) of the 1939 Act — "that the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years" — is satisfied where the wife lived apart and the husband says he was willing to maintain her had she returned; and whether the Act displaced the wife's classical grounds.
Held
Krishna Iyer J. read the beneficial statute in the light of its purpose — to protect Muslim women — and rejected the "popular fallacy" that the Muslim husband has unbridled power to end the marriage while the wife has none. On s. 2(ii) he affirmed the decree: the ground is made out on the fact of non-maintenance for two years, and is in substance a breakdown ground. On s. 2(ix) — "any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law" — he held that "Act 8 of 1939 does not abrogate the grounds already available to a woman and Section 2(ix) is clearly a statutory preservation of prior Islamic rights", and described khula as "the last gateway for a Muslim woman out of an irreparably embittered co-existence", operating under judicial supervision as the counterpart to the husband's talaq; having affirmed the decree under s. 2(ii) he did not need to decide the claim to khula. The appeal was dismissed.
The ratio, stated for an answer
- Section 2(ii) is satisfied by the fact that the husband has not maintained the wife for two years; the section is to be read as the beneficial, breakdown-oriented provision it is.
- Section 2(ix) preserves the grounds recognised by Muslim law before the Act, so the classical remedies survive alongside the statutory list.
In the app
The analysis continues in the app with Exam use — how to write this case into an answer and Viva use — how to speak to it in a viva, plus every card and question built on this case.
Related cases in this unit
- Rashid Ahmad v Anisa Khatun (Privy Council, 1932) — a triple talaq once pronounced is final, whatever the husband meant
- Shamim Ara v State of U.P. (Supreme Court, 2002) — a talaq must be pronounced, for a reason, after an attempt at reconciliation
- Shayara Bano v Union of India (Supreme Court, 2017) — talaq-e-biddat set aside
- Danial Latifi v Union of India (Supreme Court, 2001) — the 1986 Act upheld, and read to protect the divorced wife for life
- Noor Saba Khatoon v Mohd. Quasim (Supreme Court, 1997) — the children's maintenance is their own, not capped at two years
- Itwari v Asghari (Allahabad High Court, 1960) — there is no "Muslim cruelty"; a husband who takes a second wife must explain himself