B. N. Mutto v. T. K. Nandi (1978)

This is the module's illustration of a general word in a welfare statute kept at its full width against a determined attempt to cut it down. Section 14A conferred a right of immediate recovery of possession on a landlord who, "being a person" in occupation of residential premises allotted by the Central Government, was required to vacate that accommodation because he owned a house in Delhi. Everything surrounding the section — the Government's policy decision, the circular, the notice actually served — pointed to serving Government servants only. The Court still refused to read person as Government servant.

The value of the case in an answer on subsidiary rules is the method. The Court did not shut its eyes to the object; it used the object, and found that the object was wider than the policy document that prompted the amendment. Context enlarged the word; it did not confine it.

The landlord let his residential house in New Delhi to the tenant. He was a Government servant occupying Government accommodation. In September 1975 the Central Government decided that Government servants owning houses in the Union Territory of Delhi should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them. Section 14A was introduced by an Ordinance deemed to have come into force on 1 December 1975 and was later replaced by an Amendment Act.

The landlord retired on 30 November 1975. The Government's notice calling on him to vacate was served on 9 December 1975, and on the same day he filed his eviction petition. The tenant objected that the landlord was not a Government servant on the date of the petition, that the ground was the same as in an earlier pending petition, and that the premises had been let for residential or professional purposes and so were not let for residential purposes alone.

The Rent Controller rejected all three objections and refused leave to defend under s. 25B(5). The High Court, on the tenant's revision, held that as the landlord had retired before the Ordinance came into force he was outside the section.

The Court accepted frankly that the surrounding material favoured the narrower reading. The circular of 9 September 1975 and the notice served both supported the view that the Government's intention was to enable only those Government servants in occupation of Government accommodation who owned houses to get immediate possession, "though section 14A does not restrict the right to recover immediate possession to Government servants alone."

Two reasons were given for refusing to narrow the word. First, the choice of language could not be treated as a slip: "It cannot be said that it was by inadvertence that the Legislature mentioned persons instead of Government servants and made the section applicable to persons other than Government servants." Secondly, the factual premise of the narrow reading was false, because Government accommodation is provided not only to Government servants but also to Members of Parliament and other non-officials occupying important positions in public life. The Court therefore held that it would not be justified in presuming that when the legislature used the word persons "it meant only Government servants."

The rule applied was the cardinal rule as stated in Craies, that Acts are to be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves; where the words are precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound them in their ordinary and natural sense, for the words alone best declare the intention of the lawgiver. Taking the object of the Act into account there was no difficulty in giving person its plain meaning. The Court acknowledged that retired servants and others in occupation of Government accommodation might thereby gain a special advantage, but since the purpose of the legislation was to enable the Government to recover the accommodation it had provided by enabling the allottee to obtain immediate possession of the house he owned and had let, "the Court will not be justified in giving a meaning which the words used will not warrant."

On the character of the letting, the Court contrasted s. 14A with s. 14(1)(e). Section 14(1)(e) requires that the premises be let for use as a residence, and decisions such as Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj and Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal had held that a letting partly for professional or commercial use falls outside it. Section 14A uses different language: the emphasis is on the landlord's owning a residential accommodation, and even where such accommodation is let for professional or commercial purposes the premises do not cease to be residential accommodation. The requirement found in s. 14(1)(e) is simply not there in s. 14A(1).

On the pending earlier petition, the Court held the objection to have no force, the grounds under s. 14A(1) being different and based on special rights conferred on the class of persons who occupied Government accommodation. It also held that s. 25C(2) applies to an applicant under s. 14A, so that two months must elapse from the order before possession is obtained.

A landlord who retired before the date on which the Government's notice to quit was given is nonetheless entitled to the benefit of s. 14A; the word person there is not confined to Government servants; it is not necessary to show that the premises were let for residential purposes only; and the appeal was allowed.