Brahma Prakash Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh (1953)

This is the leading early Supreme Court statement on when criticism of a judge by lawyers becomes contempt of court. A Bar Association resolved that two judicial officers were "thoroughly incompetent in law". The High Court found the members guilty of contempt. The Supreme Court set that aside, and in doing so laid down the two tests — fair criticism, and libel versus contempt — and the rule that the surrounding circumstances and degree of publicity must be considered. It is the case later relied on for the proposition that an attack on a judge is a wrong done to the public.

The six appellants were members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association, Muzaffarnagar. After numerous complaints about two officers — Kanhaya Lal, a Judicial Magistrate, and Lalta Prasad, a Revenue Officer — the Committee met in camera on 20 April 1949 and resolved that "the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike." Specific complaints against each were listed, including that the Revenue Officer heard two cases at once and let the Court Reader record evidence in one.

The resolutions were typed by the President himself, not entered in the minute book, and sent with a letter marked "confidential" to the District Magistrate, the Divisional Commissioner, the Chief Secretary and the Premier of U.P. — the officers' official superiors. No copies went to the officers themselves. At the District Magistrate's instance the matter reached the Allahabad High Court, which found six members guilty of contempt, accepted their apology, and ordered them to pay Rs. 300 costs. The High Court accepted that they were not actuated by personal or improper motives. They appealed by special leave.

1. When does a reflection on a judicial officer amount to contempt by "scandalising the court"?
2. Is the question decided only on the language of the statement, or are the surrounding circumstances and degree of publicity relevant?
3. Did the Bar Association's confidential resolution amount to contempt?

The appeal was allowed and the High Court's judgment set aside. No order for costs in either court.

Purpose of contempt jurisdiction. "the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges, personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened."

Two primary considerations. First, a reflection on a judge's judicial conduct is not contempt if made in the exercise of fair and reasonable criticism: "It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created." Second, care must be taken to distinguish a libel on the judge from a contempt of court: "The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt."

Libel versus contempt. A defamatory attack may be a libel, for which the judge may sue. But if it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice, it can be punished summarily as contempt. "One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties." Actual interference need not be proved; "it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law" (the hyphen splits "administration" across a line in the report).

No privilege for lawyers. "It cannot be disputed that in regard to matters of contempt, the members of a Bar Association do not occupy any privileged or higher position than ordinary citizens."

Surrounding circumstances matter. The Court rejected the argument that the question is to be answered solely from the language of the resolution. Where it is asked whether a statement undermines public confidence in a judge, the surrounding facts and circumstances and the degree of publicity are relevant. "What is material is the nature. and extent of the publication and whether or not it was likely to have an injurious effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself" (the stray full stop after "nature" is in the reported text).

Application. Most complaints were not serious or were proper matters to bring to the District Magistrate as administrative head; the allegation that the Revenue Officer heard two cases simultaneously was grave, and "If true it is a patent illegality". Only the description of the officers as thoroughly incompetent in law was objectionable: "Those remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can scarcely be justified." But very little publicity was given; the appellants tried to keep the matter from the public and acted bona fide. "We are clearly of the opinion that the contempt, if any, was only of a technical character, and that after the affidavits were filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped."

Contempt by scandalising the court protects the public's confidence in the administration of justice, not the judge's personal reputation. A reflection on a judge is not contempt if it is fair and reasonable criticism, and a defamatory statement is contempt only if it is calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice. Whether it is so calculated is judged in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the nature and extent of publication — not merely the words used. A confidential, bona fide complaint by a Bar Association to the officers' administrative superiors was at most a technical contempt, and proceedings should have been dropped.

• What is contempt by "scandalising the court"? Distinguish it from defamation of a judge. Use the two primary considerations and the "wrong done to the judge personally" / "wrong done to the public" contrast.
• Can an advocate or Bar Association criticise a judicial officer? Within what limits? Brahma Prakash Sharma: no special privilege, but a bona fide complaint through proper administrative channels, with little publicity, is at most a technical contempt.
• Problem question: a Bar Association passes and publishes a resolution calling a judge corrupt. Contrast with this case — degree of publicity, the channel used and the nature of the imputation all count against the members.
• Link: the passage on a wrong done to the public is later applied in C. Ravichandran Iyer v Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) on Bar resolutions against judges.