Dalpat Kaur v Prahlad Singh (1993)

Every answer on temporary injunctions must state the three conditions. This is the case to cite for them, and it is the case that supplies the distinction which decides most problems: a prima facie case is not the same thing as a prima facie title.

The second half of the judgment is just as useful, because it shows the conditions being applied against a litigant with a long history of unsuccessful applications, and it lists the alternatives a court should consider before granting an injunction at all.

On 14 June 1979 the first appellant claimed to have entered into an agreement to purchase a residential house at Jaipur for Rs 51,000. He sued for specific performance and the suit was decreed ex parte. On 10 August 1983 the sale deed was executed through the court.

Round one. On 28 April 1984 the respondent's wife filed a suit and sought a temporary injunction against dispossession. The trial court rejected the application in May 1984; the High Court confirmed the rejection on 14 July 1987; the suit was then dismissed for non-prosecution.

Round two. In the first appellant's execution application, the respondent filed five objections, dismissed successively on 4 March 1987, 4 December 1987 (confirmed in revision on 20 January 1988), 4 October 1987, 17 January 1989, and 24 October 1989 (confirmed by the High Court on 7 August 1990).

Round three. The respondent's sons sued in 1988, claiming the property to be joint family property, seeking a declaration that the sale did not bind them, and asking for partition and an interim injunction. The injunction was refused on 7 July 1988 and the refusal confirmed on 26 July 1988.

Round four, the present suit. On 7 December 1988 the respondent sued alleging that the first appellant, being his counsel, had played a fraud on him, and again sought an interim injunction against dispossession. Meanwhile symbolical possession of part of the property, the shops, had been obtained by the first appellant. The trial court dismissed the application on 3 November 1990. The High Court, by the order under appeal dated 26 February 1991, allowed the applications and granted an ad interim injunction restraining the appellants from taking possession of the residential portion.

Order XXXIX Rule 1(c) permits a temporary injunction where it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit. The judgment records that clause (c) was brought on to the statute on the recommendation of the Law Commission, with effect from 1 February 1977, and that before that there was no express power except the inherent power under s. 151 to grant an interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 is primarily concerned with the preservation of the property in dispute until legal rights are adjudicated.

An injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do, or to refrain from doing, a particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to prevent future possible injury. In granting an ad interim injunction the court is preserving the subject-matter of the suit in status quo for the time being. The grant is a discretionary relief.

1. A serious disputed question to be tried, and on the facts a probability that the applicant is entitled to the relief he asks for — that is, a prima facie case. 2. That the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from a species of injury; in other words, irreparable injury would ensue before the legal right is established at trial. 3. That the comparative hardship, mischief or inconvenience likely to result from withholding the injunction is greater than that likely to arise from granting it — the balance of convenience.

Prima facie case, defined. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish by affidavit or otherwise that there is a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of a prima facie right, and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or right, is a condition of the grant. A prima facie case is not to be confused with a prima facie title, which has to be established on evidence at trial. A prima facie case means only that a substantial question has been raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on the merits.

Irreparable injury, defined. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case is not by itself enough. The court must further be satisfied that non-interference would result in irreparable injury and that no other remedy is available. Irreparable injury does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury; it means that the injury must be a material one which cannot be adequately compensated by damages.

Balance of convenience, defined. The court should exercise sound judicial discretion to assess the substantial mischief or injury likely to be caused to the applicant if the injunction is refused, and compare it with that likely to be caused to the other side if it is granted. If on weighing the competing probabilities the court considers that the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo pending the suit, an injunction will issue.

The court accepted that in a suit seeking to set aside a decree — though the subject-matter of the earlier suit has become final — an ad interim injunction may in an appropriate case be granted where the decree is attacked for fraud or for want of jurisdiction. But the court must be circumspect, must look to the conduct of the party, and must ask whether the plaintiff could be adequately compensated if the injunction were refused.

Here the conduct of the respondent militated against his bona fides. There was a sale deed executed by the court in favour of the first appellant. If the respondent ultimately succeeded at trial he could be adequately compensated by damages for use and occupation from the date of dispossession to the date of restitution. The civil court and the High Court had repeatedly refused injunctions in the earlier proceedings. Any damage to the property could be dealt with by appropriate directions in the suit, and any alienation would in any event be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens under s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The High Court had held the balance of convenience to favour an injunction without adverting to any of these material circumstances.

State the three conditions and then define each in the judgment's own terms. The marks lie in the definitions — prima facie case as distinct from prima facie title, irreparable injury as injury not compensable in damages, and balance of convenience as a comparison of mischief both ways.

Then add the practical checklist the court used, because it converts the three conditions into a usable method: is there an alternative protection available? Would damages be an adequate remedy? Does s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act already protect the applicant against alienation? What has the applicant's conduct been in earlier proceedings?

The three conditions are cumulative. The judgment says in terms that satisfaction as to a prima facie case is by itself not sufficient. A great many answers stop after finding a triable question, and that is precisely the error the High Court made here.