Durga Shankar Mehta v Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (1954)

This is an election case, but it is on a labour law syllabus for one reason: it settles that Article 136 reaches every adjudicating "Tribunal", and that no statute can shut it out by declaring the tribunal's decision "final and conclusive". Industrial Tribunals, Labour Courts and similar bodies are exactly such adjudicating bodies. When you explain why an award of an Industrial Tribunal can be brought to the Supreme Court by special leave, and what makes a body a "Tribunal" for that purpose, this case — building on Bharat Bank Ltd v Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd — is the authority. It is relied on for this in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v The Hind Cycles Ltd (1962).

Lakhnadon in Madhya Pradesh was a double-member Legislative Assembly constituency, one seat reserved for Scheduled Tribes. At the election held on 29 December 1951, the appellant Durga Shankar Mehta won the general seat and Vasant Rao (respondent 2) the reserved seat. No objection had been taken to either nomination before the Returning Officer.

Respondent 1, Raghuraj Singh, a defeated candidate, filed an election petition. The Election Tribunal, by majority, rejected the corrupt-practice allegations but found that Vasant Rao was under 25 years of age and so not qualified under Art. 173. It treated the Returning Officer's acceptance of his nomination as an "improper acceptance" under s. 100(1)(c), and declared the whole election void — unseating the appellant too. The appellant came to the Supreme Court by special leave.

1. Preliminary: could the Supreme Court entertain an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 against an Election Tribunal's decision, given Art. 329(b) and s. 105, which made the Tribunal's orders "final and conclusive"?
2. Merits: was a candidate's under-age a case of "improper acceptance" of nomination under s. 100(1)(c) (whole election void), or of "non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution" under s. 100(2)(c) (only that candidate's election void)?

The appeal was allowed in part. Only Vasant Rao's election was declared void; the appellant's election stood. No order as to costs.

Issue 1 — Article 136 covers the Election Tribunal

The Court accepted that the right to be elected is a creature of the Constitution, and that the Election Tribunal's jurisdiction is special. But "once it is held that it is a judicial Tribunal empowered and obliged to deal judicially with disputes arising out of or in connection with election, the overriding power of this Court to grant special leave, in proper cases, would certainly be attracted and this power cannot be excluded by any Parliamentary legislation."

On the meaning of "Tribunal", the Court said it was well settled by the majority in Bharat Bank "that the expression "Tribunal" as used in article 136 does not mean the same thing as "Court" but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions." The only exception is in clause (2) of the article: tribunals under laws relating to the Armed Forces.

The nature of the power: an appeal is ordinarily a creature of statute, but "The powers given by article 136 of the Constitution however are in the nature of special or residuary powers". The power is in a sense wider than the Privy Council's prerogative to entertain appeals, which legislation could take away. Theberge v Laudry therefore did not help, because "article 136 is a" "constitutional provision which no Parliamentary legislation can limit or take away." And since it overrides ordinary laws, "no presumption can arise from words and expressions declaring an adjudication of a particular Tribunal to be final and conclusive, that there was an intention to exclude the exercise of the special powers."

The Court added a caution: "the powers under article 136 are exercisable only under exceptional circumstances. The article does not create any general right of appeal from decisions of all Tribunals." Ponnuswami v Returning Officer, Namakkal was distinguished: it decided only that the High Court could not interfere under Art. 226 with a Returning Officer's order during the election, and left this point open.

Issue 2 — s. 100(2)(c), not s. 100(1)(c)

The appellant conceded the finding of under-age. Under s. 36(7), the electoral roll is conclusive of qualification unless a disqualification is alleged or proved. Vasant Rao's roll entry showed him of proper age and nobody objected at scrutiny, so the Returning Officer had to accept the nomination. It would have been an improper acceptance only if the defect was apparent on the roll or the nomination paper, or if an objection was raised and wrongly decided.

Hence "the election should be held to be void on the ground of the constitutional disqualification of the candidate and not on the ground that his nomination was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer." The phrase "non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution" in s. 100(2)(c) is wide enough "to cover such cases where the question is not one of improper acceptance or rejection of the nomination by the Returning Officer, but there is a fundamental disability in the candidate to stand for election at all." The Court treated that item as "a residuary provision". Only the disqualified candidate's election fell.

1. Article 136 confers on the Supreme Court an overriding, residuary power to grant special leave against the determination of any court or tribunal (other than Armed Forces tribunals). A "Tribunal" means any adjudicating body constituted by the State and invested with judicial, as distinguished from purely administrative or executive, functions. No legislation can exclude this power, and a statutory "final and conclusive" clause raises no presumption that it is excluded. The power is exercised only in exceptional cases.
2. Where a returned candidate is constitutionally disqualified but his nomination was properly accepted on the face of the roll, the case falls under s. 100(2)(c), and only his election is void.

• Labour law use (the reason it is on your syllabus): in answering Can an award of an Industrial Tribunal be challenged in the Supreme Court? What is a "Tribunal" under Article 136?, cite Bharat Bank and this case for the test — a State-constituted body with judicial, not purely administrative, functions — and add that a "final" clause in the statute cannot oust Art. 136. Then apply the test to the body in the question.
• Limits worth marks: the power is discretionary and exceptional; it creates no general right of appeal; Armed Forces tribunals are excluded by Art. 136(2).
• Accuracy point: this was a unanimous five-Judge decision, delivered by Mukherjea J. The judgment is dated 1954 and reported in the 1955 SCR.
• Constitutional law cross-reference: use Issue 2 for the difference between improper acceptance of nomination and a candidate's constitutional disqualification.