M. V. Joshi v. M. U. Shimpi (1961)

This is the best short illustration of the literal rule doing real work on a definition, and of the two arguments that are most often thought to displace an ordinary meaning and in fact do not: an argument from expressio unius built on neighbouring definitions, and an argument that a penal statute must be read in the accused's favour. Both were pressed here, and both failed because the words were plain.

It also shows the legitimate supporting role of purpose. The Court reached its result on the words and then observed that the conclusion carried out the clear intention of the legislature — purpose confirming a plain meaning, never creating one.

The appellant kept a shop and dealt in butter. A Food Inspector bought a quantity of Khandeshi butter from him, divided it into three sealed bottles in the presence of panchas, gave one to the appellant, sent one to the Public Analyst and kept the third. The Analyst reported the sample as containing 18.32% foreign fat, 19.57% moisture and 64.67% milk fat — below the prescribed standard.

The Magistrate acquitted, partly on the view that butter prepared from curd did not fall within the definition of butter in the Rules. The High Court reversed and convicted under s. 16(1) read with s. 7(1). The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Rule A.11.05 of Appendix B defined butter to mean "the product prepared exclusively from the milk or cream of cow or buffalo", with limits of not less than 80 per cent milk fat and not more than 16 per cent moisture, and no preservative permitted.

Section 2(i)(l) deems an article of food adulterated if its quality or purity falls below the prescribed standard, or its constituents are present in quantities in excess of the prescribed limits of variability. Section 7 prohibits manufacture for sale, storage, sale or distribution of such food, and s. 16 provides the penalty.

The appellant advanced three points. The definition spoke only of a product prepared from milk or cream, and so did not take in a product obtained from curd. Milk, cream and curd were each separately and exhaustively defined in the Rules, and the omission of curd from the butter definition was therefore a deliberate legislative indication. And the word exclusively showed that butter must come from milk or cream and from no other product.

Butter prepared from curd falls within the definition. The conviction was upheld, though the sentence of imprisonment was set aside and a fine substituted, because there had been a genuine conflict of view in the Bombay High Court on the very question.

First, how butter is in fact made. The Court set out the English creamery process and the Indian one. In rural India butter is prepared by the indigenous process from soured milk and cream, that is, curd; in some cities it is made directly from milk and cream, but that share of production is insignificant by comparison. Whichever process is used, the product is prepared from milk; the only difference is an intervening souring process.

Secondly, the words of the definition. The Court took each element — that the thing be a product, of milk or cream, of cow or buffalo, prepared from that milk, and prepared exclusively from it — and gave the operative words their ordinary meaning. Product means a thing produced by nature or a natural process or manufacture. The dictionary meaning of prepare, as the Court took it from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, is to bring a thing into proper state for use by some special or technical process, to manufacture, to make or compound; the word is comprehensive and takes in the different processes by which a thing is made ready for use in a particular form. Butter drawn from curd is therefore a product prepared from milk.

Thirdly, what exclusively governs. The Court read the word as referring to the milk or cream of cow or buffalo. Milk is elsewhere defined as the secretion of a healthy cow, buffalo, goat or sheep, whereas butter is confined to the milk of cow or buffalo. So exclusively excludes other animals, not other processes; it has no relation to other milk products. The plain meaning of the words indicates that butter prepared from milk or cream, by whatever process, is comprehended by the definition.

Fourthly, the argument from the separate definitions. Milk, cream and butter had to be defined separately because they are sold in those three forms and their adulteration has to be judged against separate standards. As for the express mention of curds in the definition of ghee, that definition was introduced later, in 1956, and the rule-making authority may have wished to clarify the position and avoid the very difficulty that had arisen over butter. The omission therefore carried no negative implication.

Fifthly, the penal-statute argument. Saying that penal statutes are strictly construed means only that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words; the language must be so construed that no case falls within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. It is also a cardinal principle that in case of doubt the construction favourable to the subject is preferred. But these rules do not affect the fundamental principle that the primary test is the language employed in the Act, and that where the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature. The Court cited Maxwell for the proposition that "the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object", and Day J. in Newby v. Sims for the view that adulteration statutes are not to be construed with any greater or less strictness than other statutes merely because they impose penalties.

Sixthly, the deeming provision. The appellant relied on Hunt v. Richardson, where under the English Act the regulation prescribing a minimum milk-fat content raised only a rebuttable presumption, so a dealer could prove genuine milk deficient in fat. Under the Indian Act the position differs: selling butter below the prescribed standard is deemed to be adulteration, and by that fiction the butter becomes adulterated food even though no foreign article has been added. A dealer cannot lead evidence that, notwithstanding the deficiency, it is not in fact adulterated.

Seventhly, purpose as confirmation. The conclusion was supported by the plain words and also carried out the clear intention of the legislature. Butter is a favourite edible fat consumed by innumerable persons in the country, and is prepared throughout rural India by churning soured milk. The appellant's construction would have made the rule a dead letter for all practical purposes and defeated the object of the legislature.

The definition of butter covers butter prepared from curd, because butter made by any process is a product prepared from milk and exclusively qualifies the animal, not the process. Selling butter below the prescribed standard is selling adulterated butter, by force of the statutory fiction, even though nothing foreign has been added. The Bombay Full Bench view in Sadashiv v. P. V. Bhalerao — that the emphasis is on the basic material from which butter is prepared and not on the process by which it is made — was approved.