Mohd. Dastagir v. State of Madras

Article 20(3) forbids compulsion. The word does the whole work, and until you know what it means the protection is either everything or nothing. Mohd. Dastagir supplies the meaning, and it supplies a memorable fact pattern in which a man effectively handed the prosecution its own case and got no protection for it.

It also settles the second requirement that students skip: the protection attaches to a person who is already an accused when the statement or production is made.

The appellant went to the residence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and handed him an envelope. On opening it, the officer found cash inside, which meant that the appellant had come to offer him a bribe. The officer refused it and asked the appellant to place the envelope and the notes on the table. The appellant did as he was told, and the cash was then seized by the police.

The Supreme Court held that the accused was not compelled to produce the currency notes, as no duress was applied to him. Moreover the appellant was not even an accused at the time the currency notes were seized from him. Article 20(3) therefore did not apply.

Step one — compulsion means duress. The term compulsion under Article 20(3) means duress. Compulsion may take many forms: if an accused is beaten, starved, tortured or harassed in order to extract a confession, the protection may be claimed.

Step two — an instruction is not duress. Being asked to put on the table what one has already brought and handed over is not duress. The appellant's own act placed the notes in the officer's hands; the direction that followed added no coercion.

Step three — voluntary production is outside the clause. If an accused voluntarily makes an oral statement, or voluntarily produces documentary evidence, incriminatory in nature, Article 20(3) is not attracted at all.

Step four — the timing requirement. The protection is for a person against whom a formal accusation has been made. A person who was not an accused when he made the statement or produced the material cannot claim it merely because he became an accused afterwards.

Use Mohd. Dastagir whenever the problem has an accused, or a not-yet-accused, handing over material or speaking without being coerced. It gives you both the definition of compulsion and the timing point, and either alone may dispose of the question.

The full checklist for an Article 20(3) answer, with the authority for each limb: was there a formal accusation at the relevant time — Mohd. Dastagir, and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani for the proposition that the protection covers the investigation stage and extends to suspects; was the person compelled to be a witness, meaning to impart personal knowledge — M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra; was there duress — this case; and if the compulsion was by a scientific technique, is that technique testimonial — Selvi v. State of Karnataka.

One related proposition sits naturally beside it: statements recorded of the accused without any duress, with or without his knowledge, are not hit by Article 20(3), which is the constitutional half of the tape-recording cases.

It does not decide whether the material seized was admissible for any other reason, and it says nothing about the weight of the evidence.