New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v The Central Government Industrial Tribunal (1953)

Can a dispute between an employer and one dismissed workman be an "industrial dispute" that the Government may refer for adjudication? The words of s. 2(k) — a dispute "connected with the employment or non-employment ... of any person" — seem wide enough. The Patna High Court said no: read in the context of the whole Act, an industrial dispute must be collective. An individual grievance becomes an industrial dispute only when it has developed into a dispute in which the body of workmen is interested.

The case also shows the practical second hurdle. Even where a union later takes up the worker's cause, there is no dispute unless a demand has been made on the employer, or the employer was at least aware of it.

Nagendra Nath Bhattacharya, a workman at the Patna branch of the New India Assurance Co. Ltd, was dismissed on 27 April 1949. On 3 May 1951 the Government of India referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal at Dhanbad under s. 10(1). The company obtained a rule from the High Court, and the Government cancelled that reference on 9 July 1951.

On the same day the Government made a fresh reference under s. 10(1)(c), describing the dispute as one between the company and the Bihar Provincial Insurance Employees' Association, Patna, over the termination of Bhattacharya's services. The Association had come into being on 13 March 1950, long after the dismissal. The company applied for certiorari to quash the reference, arguing that the Government had no jurisdiction because there was no industrial dispute.

The company's affidavit stated that the Association "did not raise any dispute at the time of the dismissal of the aforesaid Sri Nagendra Nath and did not make any demand on his behalf, which could possibly have been refused". The Association's affidavit did not specifically deny this.

1. Is a dispute between an employer and a single workman an "industrial dispute" within s. 2(k)?
2. Does s. 13 of the General Clauses Act (the singular includes the plural) require s. 2(k) to cover a solitary workman's dispute?
3. Was there, in any case, an industrial dispute on the date of the second reference because the Association had taken up the dismissed employee's cause?

The rule was made absolute. The reference of 9 July 1951 and the proceedings before the Tribunal at Dhanbad were quashed. No order as to costs.

Section 2(k) must be read in its context

Ramaswami J. rejected the argument based on s. 13 of the General Clauses Act. That rule applies only where nothing in the subject or context is repugnant, and "the proper approach is to examine Section 2(k) in the setting and the context and other important provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act."

He relied on s. 10(2) (reference on application of parties representing the majority of each party), s. 10(3) (power to prohibit strikes and lock-outs), s. 18 (settlements bind everyone employed in the establishment) and s. 36 (representation). He held that ss. 10(2) and 10(3) "contemplate a state of affairs where the action of the management in connection with a single workman has developed into a general dispute involving the whole of the workmen or the majority of the workmen in the particular establishment and there is an apprehension or threat of strike."

His conclusion: "the 'industrial dispute' referred to and defined in Section 2 (k) must be construed to mean not a dispute between an individual workman and the management but a dispute which though it may originate in an action with regard to an individual workman, has developed into a dispute in which the majority of the workmen in the establishment are interested."

Support from Madras and elsewhere

He treated this view as supported by Kandan Textile v Industrial Tribunal, Madras, noting that "The point was actually decided by Mack, J. but the Chief Justice did not express his final opinion on this point." He then relied on United Commercial Bank Ltd v Commissioner of Labour, Madras, where the Madras Chief Justice did clearly state the collective view, and on Calcutta and Travancore-Cochin decisions to the same effect.

Industrial dispute as an economic concept

The Court also reasoned from the nature of the subject: "The conception of industrial dispute is a conception in the realm of economics. It connotes a dispute between capital and labour organised in a collective sense." An industrial dispute "involves two elements, viz., (1) the dispute must relate to industrial matters; and (2) at least on one side of the dispute the disputants must be a body of men acting in collective manner and not individual." Australian authority (Jumbunna Coal Mine and George Hudson Ltd v Australian Timber Workers' Union) was cited in support.

On the facts, the dispute between the company and Bhattacharya was not an industrial dispute, the conciliation proceedings under s. 12 were without jurisdiction, and the references were "beyond jurisdiction and 'ultra vires'".

No dispute with the Association either

The Advocate-General argued that the notification raised a presumption that the Association had a dispute with the company. The Court held the presumption "is not an absolute presumption" and may be rebutted by evidence. Here nothing showed that the Association ever approached the company for reinstatement, and the company's affidavit to that effect stood undenied. Following Members of the Sasamusa Workers Union v State of Bihar, there was no industrial dispute.

Standard Coal Co. Ltd v S.P. Varma, which said that workers need not always make a formal demand on the management, was distinguished on its facts: there the management was aware of the demands. Here, "There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest or to indicate that the petitioner was aware that the Association had taken up the cause of the dismissed employee or that it was insisting on his reinstatement."

Sarjoo Prosad J., concurring

Sarjoo Prosad J. agreed, resting on the facts: nothing showed that the Association, which came into being long after the dismissal, "at any stage interested itself on behalf of the dismissed employee before the petitioner Company or took up his cause before it." He noted an apparent conflict between two Patna Division Bench decisions but found it unnecessary to resolve, since Standard Coal had to be confined to its own facts.

1. Section 2(k) is to be read in the context of the Act as a whole (especially ss. 10(2), 10(3), 18 and 36). So read, an "industrial dispute" is not a dispute between an individual workman and the management; it is a dispute which, even if it began with one workman, has developed into a dispute in which the body of workmen in the establishment is interested.
2. A union's later interest in a dismissed worker's case does not by itself create an industrial dispute. There must be a demand on the employer, or at least the employer's awareness of the demand; the recital in a reference notification is only a rebuttable presumption that a dispute exists.

• Direct question: Can an individual dispute be an industrial dispute under s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act? Discuss the early High Court view. Use New India Assurance with Kandan Textile: the collective reading drawn from ss. 10(2), 10(3), 18 and 36.
• Statutory interpretation angle: why did s. 13 of the General Clauses Act not help? Because the singular-plural rule yields to a repugnant context, and the Act's scheme was held to be collective.
• Problem question: a worker is dismissed; a union formed a year later asks the Government for a reference but never writes to the employer. Apply this case: no demand and no awareness on the employer's part, so no industrial dispute and no valid reference.
• Definition answer: quote the two elements — industrial matters, and a body of men acting collectively on at least one side.