Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2011)

The statute protects the child of a void or voidable marriage by declaring it legitimate. The question is how far that legitimacy carries in the matter of property. Earlier decisions had confined such a child to the self-acquired property of the parents. This judgment says that such a child has a right to whatever becomes the property of the parents, whether self-acquired or ancestral — and grounds that reading in the child's own innocence and dignity. It is the central case in this paper on the rights of the child born outside a valid marriage.

The first defendant had two wives: the third plaintiff, his first wife, and the fourth defendant, his second. He had two children by the first wife — the first and second plaintiffs — and two children by the second wife.

The first wife and her two children sued for partition and separate possession, claiming a one-fourth share each in ancestral property. Their case was that the first defendant had married the second woman while his first marriage subsisted, so that her children were not coparceners and could take no share in the ancestral property.

The defendants said the properties were self-acquired except for one, that the second wife was the legally wedded wife and not the first, and that an oral partition had already taken place.

The trial court held that the first defendant had proved neither the oral partition nor any divorce from the first wife; that the second marriage was void, having been contracted while the first subsisted; that the first wife was therefore the legally wedded wife entitled to claim partition; and that the properties were ancestral. It gave the plaintiffs and the first defendant a one-fourth share each. The first appellate court affirmed those findings, holding the second marriage void and the children of that marriage illegitimate.

The Court held that a child of a void or voidable marriage, being statutorily legitimate, has a right to whatever becomes the property of the parents, whether self-acquired or ancestral, subject only to the limit that the right is confined to the property of the parents and cannot be asserted against anyone else. Being unable to agree with three earlier decisions of the Court which had confined such children to self-acquired property, the Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench.

1. The amendment displaced the common law. With the amendment of the provision, the common law view that the offspring of a void or voidable marriage are illegitimate by operation of law has to change completely. The Court must recognise a status which the legislature has declared legitimate, and must recognise simultaneously the rights of such children in their parents' property. This is a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy from children who are as innocent as any other children.

1. The protection has a boundary. The benefit is available only where there is a marriage which is void or voidable under the Act.

1. How it works in a joint family. Such children are entitled only to a share in their parents' property and cannot claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of ancestral property, the property falling to the share of the parents is regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property; and since such children are equated with the legitimate offspring of a valid marriage, there is no reason why they should have no share in it. The only limitation is that during the lifetime of their parents such children cannot ask for partition; they may exercise the right only after the parents' death.

1. Separate the child from the parents' relationship. The relationship between the parents may not be sanctioned by law, but the birth of a child in such a relationship has to be viewed independently of that relationship. A child born in such a relationship is innocent and is entitled to all the rights given to other children born in a valid marriage. That is the crux of the amendment.

1. Interpret a beneficial statute purposively. The Court cannot interpret socially beneficial legislation as if the words were cast in stone; such legislation must be given a purposive interpretation to further and not to frustrate the eminently desirable social purpose of removing the stigma. In doing so the Court must have regard to the equity of the statute and to the Directive Principles, since it is the duty of the State to apply those principles in making laws, and the higher judiciary is part of the State — the judicial process being State action, the judiciary is bound to apply the Directive Principles in its judgments.

1. The two constitutional anchors. The directive requiring the State to secure that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment, must be kept in mind in construing the provision. And since the right to property, though no longer fundamental, is a constitutional right guaranteeing against deprivation save by authority of law, the provision — which imposes no restriction on such children's property right except confining it to the property of their parents — must not be read to impose further restrictions.

1. The equality values of the Preamble. The differing view rests on the constitutional values of the Preamble, which focus on equality of status and opportunity and on individual dignity.

It opens the question of the rights of a child of a void or voidable marriage, which is a standing topic in this paper. Set out the statutory conferment of legitimacy, then the two competing readings — confined to self-acquired property, or extending to whatever becomes the parents' property — and then this Court's reasons for the wider reading.

It disposes of the argument that a statutorily legitimate child takes nothing from the parents' share of ancestral property.

It does not settle the law. The Bench expressly differed from three earlier decisions and referred the question to a larger Bench, so an answer must present this as a reference and not as the final position. Note also the two limits the judgment itself preserves: the child's right is confined to the property of the parents, and it cannot be asserted during the parents' lifetime by demanding partition.