Rickards v Lothian (1913)

Rylands v Fletcher makes an occupier liable without proof of negligence for the escape of something he brought onto his land. Left unqualified, that rule would make every householder an insurer of his neighbours. This case supplies the two limits that keep it within bounds, and both are examined constantly:

1. The act of a stranger. There is no liability under the rule for damage caused by the wrongful act of a third person.
2. Non-natural user. The rule applies only to a special use bringing with it increased danger, not to the ordinary use of land.

The second is the more important, because it is the phrase that decides most problems. Lord Moulton's formulation is the one to quote, and it does two things at once: it requires a special, danger-increasing use, and it excludes any use "proper for the general benefit of the community".

The plaintiff, Lothian, was the tenant of the second floor of premises in Melbourne, where he kept his stock in trade. The defendant, Rickards, owned the building.

Someone — a malicious third party, never identified — deliberately blocked the waste pipe of a lavatory basin on an upper floor and turned the tap full on. The water overflowed and flooded down, damaging the plaintiff's stock.

The jury found for the plaintiff and the trial judge entered judgment for £156. The Supreme Court of Victoria set that aside and entered judgment for the defendant. Lord Moulton noted that although "the sum involved is not large the legal questions raised by the case are of considerable importance and the litigation has been characterised by remarkable differences of judicial opinion upon them" — a fair warning that the point was genuinely difficult.

1. Is an occupier liable under Rylands v Fletcher for an escape brought about by the deliberate wrongful act of a stranger?
2. Is the ordinary domestic water supply of a building a non-natural user of land, so as to attract the rule at all?

The appeal was allowed; the defendant was not liable. Two independent grounds, and you should give both — each alone disposes of the case.

First ground — the act of a stranger

Their Lordships approved the line of authority holding that an occupier need not guard against deliberate wrongdoing by third parties. A defendant cannot "be expected to anticipate that which happened here and the law does not require them to construct their reservoirs and the sluices and gates leading to it to meet any amount of pressure which the wrongful act of a third person may impose." Their Lordships were accordingly "of opinion that a Defendant is not liable on the principle of Fletcher v. Rylands for damage caused by the wrongful acts of third persons."

Second ground — non-natural user

This is the passage to learn:

"It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play that principle. It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community."

Their Lordships drew on Lord Robertson in Eastern and South African Telegraph Co v Cape Town Tramways Cos [1902] AC 393, where the rule was said to subject "to a high liability the owner who uses his property for purposes other than those which are natural"; and on Wright J in Blake v Woolf [1898] 2 QB 426, whose statement the Board set out in full:

"The general rule laid down in Rylands v Fletcher is that prima facie a person occupying land has an absolute right not to have his premises invaded by injurious matter, such as large quantities of water which his neighbour keeps upon his land. That general rule is, however, qualified by some exceptions, one of which is that, where a person is using his land in the ordinary way and damage happens to the adjoining property without any default or negligence on his part, no liability attaches to him. The bringing of water to such premises as these and the maintaining a cistern in the usual way seems to me to be an ordinary and reasonable user of such premises as these were; and, therefore, if the water escapes without any negligence or default on the part of the person bringing the water in and owning the cistern, I do not think that he is liable for any damage that may ensue."

The Board noted this was "entirely in agreement with the judgment of Blackburn J in Ross v Fedden" — Blackburn J being the author of the rule in Rylands itself, which is why the point carries such weight.

Supplying a building with water through an ordinary lavatory basin is therefore an ordinary and reasonable use of premises, not a non-natural one.

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher does not apply (a) where the escape is caused by the wrongful act of a stranger, or (b) where the defendant's use of the land is an ordinary use, rather than a special use bringing increased danger to others — a use proper for the general benefit of the community being ordinary in this sense.

• Direct question: State the exceptions to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Give the full set — plaintiff's own default, consent, statutory authority, act of God, act of a stranger, and non-natural user — and cite this case for the last two, with Lord Moulton's sentence quoted.
• Problem question pattern: a burst pipe, an overflowing cistern, a blocked basin, a domestic water tank. Ordinary user; no liability under the rule; the claimant must prove negligence instead.
• If a third party interfered deliberately, say so expressly and cite the first ground; it disposes of the claim without reaching non-natural user.
• Contrast to draw: Rickards (1913) → Cambridge Water (1994) → M.C. Mehta (1987) shows the rule being narrowed in England and abandoned in India for hazardous industry.