Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters (1989)

The case answers a question every student of State liability must be able to answer: when a police officer beats a person to death, can the family recover compensation from the State, and can the Supreme Court award it directly in a writ petition under Article 32? The Court said yes on both counts. It treated the State's responsibility for the wrongs of its employees as settled law, and it ordered the Delhi Administration to pay Rs. 75,000 to the mother of a nine-year-old boy who died after being beaten by a Station House Officer.

It belongs to the phase in which the Supreme Court began awarding money compensation in writ proceedings for wrongs done by State officials, instead of sending victims to a civil suit.

SAHELI, a women's and civil rights organisation, filed writ petitions under Article 32 on behalf of two women, Kamlesh Kumari and Maya Devi, each a tenant of a single room in a house at Anand Parbat, Delhi. Persons claiming to have bought the house were evicting the tenants. Kamlesh Kumari had obtained a court order staying her forcible eviction, but the so-called landlords cut off her water and electricity.

The Station House Officer of Anand Parbat Police Station, Lal Singh, repeatedly called Kamlesh Kumari to the police station and told her to vacate, at one point threatening to lock her up. On 13 November 1987 her children were taken to the police station and held until her lawyer got them released; Maya Devi was thrown out of her room the same day.

On 14 November 1987 Kamlesh Kumari was attacked by the landlord's sons, accompanied by Lal Singh in civilian clothes and a Sub-Inspector in uniform. She was beaten and molested. Her nine-year-old son Naresh clung to her to protect her; Lal Singh threw him on the floor and asked one of the landlord's sons to beat him. Kamlesh Kumari was taken to the police station, charged with trespass and sent to Tihar Jail. When she was released on 16 November she found Naresh badly hurt. He was admitted to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital on 18 November and died on 26 November 1987.

A case was registered under s. 308/34 IPC and later altered to s. 304/34 IPC. The Crime Branch inspector, opposing bail for the landlord's son, reported that there seemed to be "a high level conspiracy in getting the rooms of tenants got vacated by the landlord". The Deputy Commissioner of Police's counter-affidavit, filed for the Commissioner, admitted that "The S.H.O. himself took part in the beatings" and that the injuries caused fever and pneumonitis and "finally resulted in his death".

The petitioners asked for directions to pay Kamlesh Kumari exemplary damages for the death of her son.

1. Was the child's death caused by the beating given by the police?
2. Is the State liable to pay compensation for the tortious acts of its police officers?
3. What order should the Court make under Article 32?

The petitions were disposed of with a direction that the Delhi Administration (respondent No. 2) pay Rs. 75,000 to Kamlesh Kumari within four weeks.

Cause of death

On the Crime Branch report, the police's own counter-affidavit and the fact that a prosecution had been launched, the Court found that Naresh "was done to death on account of the beating and assault by the agency of the sovereign power acting in violation and excess of the power vested in such agency." The mother was therefore entitled to compensation from the Delhi Administration.

Damages for bodily harm

An action for damages, the Court said, lies for bodily harm, which includes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death. In cases of assault, battery and false imprisonment the damages are at large and represent a solatium "for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death."

Liability of the State

"It is well settled now that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees." The Court relied on Joginder Kaur v Punjab State [1969] ACJ 28, which it quoted for the proposition that "the State is liable for tortious acts committed by its employees in the course of their employment", and on State of Rajasthan v Mst. Vidhyawati [1962] Supp 2 SCR 989, where it had been held that the State "should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such as any other employer." Vidhyawati had explained that the Crown's immunity in the United Kingdom rested on "old feudalistic notions of Justice" and had never operated in India.

The Court also referred to its own order in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v Police Commissioner, Delhi (13 January 1989), where a labourer beaten to death at a police station after asking for wages led to an award of Rs. 75,000 to his family.

Recovery from officers and pending prosecution

The Delhi Administration "may take appropriate steps for recovery of the amounts paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers who will be found responsible, if they are so advised." Because the police officers were not parties, the Court said its observations were not to affect any proceedings, especially the criminal prosecution pending against them.

The State is liable to pay compensation for death or bodily harm caused by its police officers acting in violation and in excess of their powers, and the Supreme Court may award that compensation directly in proceedings under Article 32. Having paid, the State may recover the amount from the officers found responsible.

• Direct question: Discuss the liability of the State for the torts of its servants in India. Use Saheli with Vidhyawati (which it quotes) as authority that the State is liable like any other employer, and as an example of compensation awarded in a writ petition.
• Problem question: a person dies after a beating in police custody or by police officers helping a private party. Apply Saheli: the State pays compensation; it may recover from the officers responsible.
• Point worth marks: the Court's list of heads of bodily harm — battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death — and its description of damages in such cases as a solatium for mental pain, distress, indignity and loss of liberty.
• Cross-reference: read with Bhim Singh v State of J&K (1985) and Sebastian M. Hongray v Union of India (1984) as part of the development of compensation for violation of rights under Article 32.