State of Andhra Pradesh v Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (2000)

This is the case to cite when an examiner asks whether Kasturi Lal is still good law. A prisoner was killed by a bomb thrown into his cell after the police ignored repeated warnings. The State pleaded that running a jail is a sovereign function. The Supreme Court refused that defence outright, held that a prisoner keeps his fundamental rights including the right to life, and said in terms that Kasturi Lal "has paled into insignificance and is no longer of any binding value."

It also settles a limitation point that matters in practice: the short one-year period under Article 72 of the Limitation Act protects only bona fide acts done under a statute, never mala fide ones.

Challa Chinnappa Reddy and his son Challa Ramkrishna Reddy were arrested on 25 April 1977 and remanded to judicial custody in Cell No. 7 of the Sub-jail, Koilkuntla, in Kurnool District. Both told the police that there was a conspiracy to kill them; they wrote to the Collector and the Home Minister; and on 5 May 1977 they told the Circle Inspector that an attack would be made that very night. The Circle Inspector did not take it seriously, and no extra guards were posted. The deceased asked his own followers to sleep near the jail.

At about 3.30 a.m. that night, persons entered the jail premises and threw bombs into Cell No. 7. The father sustained grievous injuries and died in hospital; the son escaped with injuries. In his dying declaration the father said that the Sub-Inspector of Police was party to the conspiracy. The High Court found that only two constables, instead of nine, were on guard that night.

The son, his brothers and their mother sued the State for Rs 10 lakh. The State pleaded that the suit was time-barred and that maintaining a jail is a sovereign function. The trial court accepted both pleas and dismissed the suit. The High Court decreed Rs 1,44,000 with 6 per cent interest. The State appealed.

1. Was the suit, filed on 9 June 1980, barred by the one-year period in Article 72 of the Limitation Act 1963, or governed by the three-year residuary Article 113?
2. Is the State immune from liability in damages because the establishment and maintenance of jails is a sovereign function?

The appeal was dismissed. The High Court's decree stood.

On limitation

Article 72 applies only where compensation is claimed for an act or omission "in pursuance of any enactment". The Court held that "If the act or omission complained of is not alleged to be in pursuance of the statutory authority, this Article would not apply", and that although the Article does not speak of bona fides, "it is obvious that the shorter period of limitation, provided by this Article, cannot be claimed in respect of an act which was malicious in nature".

On the facts: "Since the Sub-Inspector of Police himself was in conspiracy, the act in not providing adequate security at the jail cannot be treated to be an act or omission in pursuance of a statutory duty". The action "was wholly mala fide", and the protection of the shorter period "is available only in respect of bona fide acts." The High Court was right to apply the residuary Article 113, and the suit was within time.

On negligence

The Court accepted the High Court's findings: the prisoners' requests for protection "were not heeded to", the Sub-Inspector was in the conspiracy, and "only two Constables, instead of nine, were put on duty." The High Court had described the failure to provide even the normal guard as gross negligence.

On sovereign immunity

The Court traced immunity to the maxim that the King can do no wrong, and noted that even in England the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 had largely equated the Crown with a private citizen in tort. It then held: "The Maxim that King can do no wrong or that the Crown is not answerable in tort has no place in Indian jurisprudence where the power vests, not in the Crown, but in the people who elect their representatives to run the Government".

On prisoners: "A prisoner, be he a convict or under-trial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his Fundamental Rights including the Right to Life guaranteed to him under the Constitution." Therefore "the Fundamental Rights, which also include basic human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and those rights cannot be defeated by pleading the old and archaic defence of immunity in respect of sovereign acts which has been rejected several times by this Court."

The Court quoted at length from N. Nagendra Rao & Co v State of A.P. (1994), referred to Common Cause v Union of India (1999), and concluded: "In this process of judicial advancement, Kasturi Lal's case (supra) has paled into insignificance and is no longer of any binding value."

It added that the compensation cases decided in public law — Nilabati Behera, Sawinder Singh Grower, D.K. Basu — made no difference to its conclusion, because here police negligence and the Sub-Inspector's conspiracy were established facts; and it closed by observing that "the law has marched ahead like a Pegasus but the Government attitude continues to be conservative".

1. The State cannot plead sovereign immunity to defeat a claim for damages for the death of a prisoner in custody caused by the negligence of its police; a prisoner retains his fundamental rights, including the right to life under Article 21.
2. Article 72 of the Limitation Act 1963 protects only acts or omissions done bona fide in pursuance of an enactment. A mala fide act — here a Sub-Inspector's part in a conspiracy to kill — falls outside it, and the residuary three-year Article 113 applies.

• Direct question: Is the doctrine of sovereign immunity still part of Indian law? Discuss with reference to Kasturi Lal and later cases. Trace Kasturi Lal → Nagendra Rao → this case, and quote the "paled into insignificance" line.
• Problem question: an undertrial is assaulted or killed in jail after the authorities ignore warnings. Apply this case: no sovereign immunity; Article 21 survives custody; and if the officers acted mala fide, the one-year Article 72 period does not apply.
• Limitation sub-question: When does Article 72 of the Limitation Act apply to a suit against a public officer? Only to bona fide acts under colour of a statute; mala fide acts go to Article 113.