State of Rajasthan v Union of India (1977)

After the 1977 Lok Sabha elections the new Union Government told the Congress Chief Ministers of nine States that their Assemblies should be dissolved and fresh elections held. Six States sued the Union in the Supreme Court. The Court refused to stop the dissolutions — but the reasons, especially those of Bhagwati J, laid down two ideas that later cases built on.

First: a question does not escape the Court merely because it is political. Every constitutional question concerns power, so every one is in a sense political; the Court still has to decide whether an authority has kept within its limits. Second: the President's "satisfaction" under Art. 356(1), though made final by cl. (5), can be examined where it is mala fide or based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds, because then there is no satisfaction at all. The first idea is the one the Court later adopted in B.R. Kapur v State of Tamil Nadu (2001).

The Lok Sabha was dissolved on 8 January 1977. In the March 1977 elections the ruling Congress lost its majority, and the Janata Party formed the Government at the Centre on 24 March 1977. Congress was still in power in several States, including Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

On 18 April 1977 the Union Home Minister wrote to the Chief Ministers of these States "earnestly commending" that they advise their Governors to dissolve the Assemblies under Art. 174(2)(b) and seek a fresh mandate. On 22 April the Union Law Minister said in a radio interview that a clear case had been made out for dissolution because the ruling party had been rejected in the Lok Sabha elections.

Six States — Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa — filed suits under Art. 131 seeking a declaration that the Home Minister's letter was unconstitutional, and injunctions restraining the Union from acting under Art. 356. Three members of the Punjab Assembly filed writ petitions under Art. 32, alleging violation of their fundamental rights.

1. Were the suits maintainable under Art. 131 — was this a dispute involving a legal right of the States?
2. Is a question barred from judicial scrutiny because it is political?
3. How far can the Court examine the President's satisfaction under Art. 356(1), given cl. (5)?
4. Is the defeat of the ruling party in the Lok Sabha elections a ground on which Art. 356 may be invoked?
5. Were the Home Minister's "directive" and the threatened dissolution open to challenge, and were the MLAs' fundamental rights infringed?

The suits and the writ petitions were dismissed, and interim injunctions refused. The Judges gave separate reasons; on some points they differed.

Maintainability under Art. 131

Opinions divided. Chandrachud J held the suits fell within Art. 131, but only because a legal issue arose: "Mere wrangles between governments have no place in the scheme of that article." Bhagwati J (for Gupta J and himself) also held the suits could not be thrown out in limine. Goswami, Untwalia and Fazal Ali JJ held the suits not maintainable, because the dispute concerned the State Governments rather than the legal rights of the States.

Political questions — Bhagwati J

The Union argued that the problem was political and not justiciable. Bhagwati J rejected this. A purely political question involving no legal or constitutional right would not be entertained. "But merely because a question has a political complexion, that by itself is no ground why the Court should shrink from performing its duty under the Constitution if it raises an issue of constitutional determination. Every constitutional question concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political."

Where the question is whether an authority "has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed it would be its constitutional obligation to do so." And: "the Constitution is Suprema lex, the paramount law of the land, and there is no department or branch of government above or beyond it."

Limits of review of Art. 356 — Bhagwati J

The President's satisfaction is subjective. The Court cannot examine the correctness or adequacy of the facts on which it rests; to do so would be to "enter the 'Political thicket', which it must avoid if it is to retain its legitimacy with the people."

But cl. (5) is not a total bar. The satisfaction is a condition precedent, and "this immunity from attack cannot apply where the challenge is not that the satisfaction is improper or unjustified, but that there is, no satisfaction at all." That is the position where the satisfaction is mala fide or rests on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds.

The ground itself — Bhagwati J

Loss in the Lok Sabha elections, alone, would not do: "To dissolve the Legislative Assembly solely on such ground would be an indirect exercise of the right of recall of all the members by the President without there being any provision in the Constitution for recall even by the electorate."

Here, however, the rout was total, showing complete alienation between Government and people. Whether that was fraught with a breakdown "is entirely a matter of political judgment for the executive branch of Government." The ground was not wholly extraneous: "We hold that on the facts and circumstances of the present case this ground is clearly a relevant ground having reasonable nexus with the matter in regard to which the President is required to be satisfied".

Beg CJ

Beg CJ took a similar line on the test of review: "So long as the reasons, if any are disclosed, given for the action proposed or taken, bear a reasonable nexus with the exercise of the particular power, the satisfaction of the President must be treated as conclusive." He also observed that the Constitution's operations are, "judged both by the contents of power which a number of its provisions carry with them and the use that has been made of them, more unitary than federal."

The "directive" and the MLAs' petitions

The Home Minister's letter was, per Bhagwati J, "nothing but an advice or suggestion to the Chief Minister of each plaintiff State"; it "has no constitutional authority behind it", so no declaration or injunction could be granted against it. The MLAs' petitions failed: per Chandrachud J, "the injury to the alleged fundamental right of the petitioners is too indirect and remote."

The dissolution-related suits and petitions failed. Two propositions from the opinions are the ones cited:

1. A question is not taken outside the Court's jurisdiction merely because it has a political complexion. Where it raises an issue of constitutional determination — whether an authority has acted within or beyond its constitutional power — the Court must decide it (Bhagwati J, for himself and Gupta J).
2. Under Art. 356, the Court will not examine the sufficiency or adequacy of the grounds of the President's satisfaction; but cl. (5) does not protect a satisfaction that is mala fide or rests on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds, since that is no satisfaction at all. A massive electoral rejection of the State's ruling party was held a relevant ground.

• Direct question: Discuss the scope of judicial review of a Proclamation under Article 356. State the limited test from this case — no review of sufficiency, but review for mala fides or wholly extraneous grounds — and explain why cl. (5) does not bar it.
• Political question doctrine: "No constitutional question can fail to be political." Discuss. Use Bhagwati J's passage and note that the Court adopted it in B.R. Kapur v State of Tamil Nadu.
• Art. 131: What kind of dispute can be brought under Article 131? Use Chandrachud J — a legal right must be in issue, not "mere wrangles between governments" — and contrast the Judges who held the suits not maintainable.
• Federalism: quote Beg CJ's "more unitary than federal" remark as the Court's view at that time of the Centre–State balance.