Say the ratio out loud before you open Reasoning — recalling it unprompted is exactly what the exam pays for.
Why it matters
The child witness is the standard problem on competency, and it is a problem precisely because the statute sets no age. The section disqualifies a person only if tender years prevent him from understanding the questions put or from giving rational answers. Suresh applies that literally, and in doing so fixes both halves of the law: a very young child may testify, and a court must scrutinise what the child says.
Facts
The question was whether, and at what age, a child could depose as a witness.
Held
A child as young as five years can depose evidence if he understands the questions and answers them in a relevant and rational manner. Age is of no consequence; it is the mental faculties and understanding that matter.
In the same line of authority it was held that a child who is not administered an oath because of his young years, and who is not required to give coherent or straight answers, is a privileged witness who can give evidence — but that evidence should not be relied upon totally and completely.
Reasoning
Step one — the statutory test is the only test. Because the section speaks of understanding and rational answers, no threshold age can be read into it. The enquiry is individual.
Step two — competency established, the court moves to caution. The child's evidence has to be scrutinised, and caution exercised according to each case. The court has to satisfy itself that the evidence of the child is reliable and untainted.
Step three — tutoring is the specific danger. Any sign of tutoring will render the evidence questionable. The risk being one of suggestion rather than of dishonesty, it is detected by looking at the manner of the child's answers, not merely at their content.
Step four — corroboration is prudence, not law. If the court is satisfied, it may convict a person without looking for corroboration of a child's evidence. It has been stated many times that support for a child's evidence should be a rule of prudence, and is very desirable.
Exam use
Use Suresh for the rule (no minimum age, understanding is everything) and then run the caution in a fixed order: competency under BSA s. 124; the voire dire, which is desirable though not essential; signs of tutoring; and corroboration as a rule of prudence rather than of law.
Two supporting authorities are worth naming. In M. Sugal v. The King (1945) 48 BLR 138 a girl of about ten was allowed to give evidence of a murder she had witnessed, as she could understand the questions and answer them frankly, even though she could not understand the nature of an oath; the same principle was applied in India in Queen v. Sewa Bhogta (1874) 14 Beng and in Prakash Singh v. State of M.P. AIR 1993 SC 65. And Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54 supplies the proposition that the omission of the oath goes to credibility, not competency — which is what allows the unsworn child's evidence to be received at all.
It does not lay down any minimum age, and it does not make corroboration a condition of conviction.
A note on practice. From the 1990s the courts began recording their opinion that the child witness had understood the duty of telling the truth, so as to lend credibility to the evidence collected, and the Supreme Court has commended the practice. An answer that recommends this step is answering the how, which is where the last marks usually sit.