The Kandan Textile Ltd. v The Industrial Tribunal I (1949)

Two questions sit at the very start of every adjudication: did the Government have material before it when it referred the dispute, and is there really an "industrial dispute" at all? Kandan Textiles answers the first firmly and opens the second.

On the reference, the Court held that the Government cannot simply copy a union's list of grievances into a reference order. It must apply its mind to material showing that a dispute exists or is apprehended.

On the nature of an industrial dispute, Rajamannar C.J. read ss. 10(2) and 18 as pointing towards a collective dispute — one taken up by a substantial number of the workmen — rather than a purely individual quarrel between one dismissed worker and the employer. This is the opinion later cited in the debate on whether an individual dispute can be an industrial dispute. Mack J. put it more bluntly: a dismissed workman's cause becomes an industrial dispute only if a union or a substantial body of workmen still in employment espouses it.

Kandan Textiles Ltd owned a small weaving mill at Tiruvottiyur, Madras, with about 200 workers. In January 1948 a workman, R.M. Sundaram, was dismissed for the loss of a flexible shaft. In August 1948 the boiler broke down and the mill closed until 12 October 1948. On reopening, 48 workers were left out. Some who later returned refused to work on newly allotted looms and were dismissed.

There were two rival unions. The Kandan Textiles Labour Union, sponsored by the management, had the majority of workmen as members. The Kandan Weaving Workers' Union was registered on 18 October 1948; the dismissed Sundaram claimed to be its secretary, and its president, Sreenivasan, was not a workman of the mill. That union never wrote to the management, but on 4 December 1948 its president wrote to the Government listing eleven disputes and asking for a reference.

On 8 December 1948 the Government of Madras referred eleven matters to the Industrial Tribunal under s. 10(1)(c), reciting that it acted on the report of the Commissioner of Labour and referring to two of his letters. It was admitted in the High Court that none of the eleven matters appeared in those letters; the only dispute the Commissioner had reported (seniority in taking back workers) was not among them. The eleven items had been copied verbatim from the union president's letter. The Tribunal made an award on 23 May 1949, which the Government declared binding. The company sought certiorari to quash it.

1. Can a writ of certiorari issue when the Government has declared the award binding under s. 15? (Preliminary objection.)
2. Was the reference valid when the Government had no material before it showing that the referred matters were in dispute?
3. Did an industrial dispute exist at all, given that no demand had been made on the management and the union's authority to represent the workers was unproved?
4. Can a dispute between the employer and an individual workman, or a few workmen, be an "industrial dispute" under s. 2(k) unless a substantial body of workmen takes it up?

The award and the Tribunal's proceedings were quashed. No order as to costs.

Preliminary objection

Overruled, on the authority of Ponnambala Desikar v Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The Advocate-General did not seriously press it.

The reference was invalid

The Government, before referring under s. 10(1), "must be satisfied that the industrial dispute which is being referred for adjudication exists or is apprehended; and the Government should have material before it to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended." The Advocate-General conceded this.

A letter from some individual or organisation is not enough: "It is incumbent upon the Government to apply its mind to the relevant material placed before it before deciding that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". (The word "mind" is a printing error for "mind" in the report.) The Court approved Ramayya Pantulu v Kutty and Rao (Engineer) Ltd.

On the facts, there was nothing before the Government on which it could have decided that the eleven matters were in dispute, and the union itself did not press five of them before the Tribunal. Rajamannar C.J. concluded: "I have no hesitation in holding that the reference made by the Government in this case was neither competent nor valid."

No industrial dispute was proved to exist

There was no evidence that the aggrieved workers, or others on their behalf, ever made a demand on the management for reinstatement which was refused. The Court drew on the Federal Court's decision in Western India Automobile Association v Industrial Tribunal, Bombay on the ways such a demand may arise.

The union's authority was not proved: its president was not a workman, there were no particulars of membership, and nothing showed that its members had resolved to take up the aggrieved workers' cause. The Court held: "it was incumbent on the union by production of the relevant records to positively establish the fact that the union is entitled to represent and that it is, as a matter of fact, representing these 36 aggrieved workers." Section 36(1), on representation by an officer of a registered union, "has nothing whatever to do with the question whether there is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act."

And a grievance is not a dispute: "A dismissed workman may feel himself aggrieved but may make no-demand on the management, or after a demand and refusal may not pursue the matter further; in which case it would be wrong to say that an industrial dispute exists."

Individual and collective disputes (observations)

Rajamannar C.J. accepted that the words of s. 2(k), read literally, are wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and one workman. He refused to cut them down by the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and did not think s. 10(2) necessarily required the majority of workmen to be a party. But s. 18, which binds everyone employed in the establishment, "undoubtedly suggests that some-thing more than an individual dispute between a worker or a few workers and the employer is meant by an industrial dispute. It suggests that it must be a collective dispute".

He reviewed English cases (Conway v Wade, NALGO v Bolton Corporation, Ex parte Keable Press) and Australian cases (Jumbunna Coal Mine, George Hudson Ltd v Australian Timber Workers' Union), finding none directly in point. Because the reference was already held invalid, he said these questions "need not be finally decided", and suggested the Legislature state its intention more clearly.

Mack J., concurring

Mack J. was more categorical: the Act was never intended to provide machinery for redress by a dismissed workman, or even by a group of workmen dismissed together: "They cannot by joining in a demand for re-instatement create an industrial dispute after their dismissal." But, he added, "If such a dismissal however even of an individual workman is taken up by a. Workers' Union or a substantial body of workmen who continue in employment and espouse his cause then an industrial dispute may arise."

He found the Kandan Weaving Workers' Union to be "a mere bogus affair which had no legitimate origin and in fact no real existence at all", and held: "Registration of an Union under the Indian Trade Unions Act is not conclusive proof of its real existence. It may raise a presumption to this effect." He advised Registrars to use their power under s. 7 of the Trade Unions Act freely, and warned that "The greatest caution should be exercised by Government before referring any point for determination to a Tribunal".

1. Before referring a dispute under s. 10(1), the Government must have material before it and must apply its mind to that material to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. A reference that merely copies a list of demands from a letter, with no material showing those matters are in dispute, is invalid, and the award founded on it is without jurisdiction.
2. An industrial dispute is not proved to exist where no demand was made on the employer and refused, and where the body claiming to raise the dispute has not established its authority to represent the workmen concerned.

The view that an individual dispute becomes an industrial dispute only when espoused collectively was expressed in this case (firmly by Mack J.; as a strong suggestion by the Chief Justice), but the Chief Justice expressly left it undecided.

• Direct question: When does an individual dispute become an industrial dispute? Discuss with case law. Use Kandan Textiles as the early High Court opinion that s. 18 points to a collective dispute, and Mack J.'s test of espousal by a union or a substantial body of workmen still in employment.
• Reference question: Is the Government's power of reference under s. 10 subject to judicial review? Use the holding that the Government must have material and apply its mind; a reference copied from a union letter is invalid.
• Problem question: a dismissed worker's grievance is taken to Government by a union with no proven membership and no demand on the employer. Apply Kandan Textiles: no demand and refusal, no proved authority to represent — no industrial dispute, and a reference would fail.
• Trade union point: registration raises only a presumption that a union really exists; it is not conclusive (Mack J.).