A. K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969)

It does two things at once. It holds that "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated", and gives the five-factor test for distinguishing them; and it holds that natural justice applies to administrative enquiries, ending the old rule that a duty to act judicially had to be found in the statute before any hearing was due. Both holdings are constantly examined.

Section 2(a) of the All India Services Act 1951 authorised the Central Government to constitute three new All India Services including the Indian Forest Service, and section 3 required it to make recruitment rules after consulting the State Governments. Rule 4(1) of the 1966 Rules allowed the Central Government to recruit from the State Forest Service "any person from amongst the members of the State Forest Service adjudged suitable in accordance with such Regulations as the Central" Government might make. Regulation 5 of the Initial Recruitment Regulations 1966 required the Board to prepare a list in order of preference of officers "adjudged by the Board suitable for appointment to posts in the senior and junior scales of the service."

The Chief Conservator of Forests, Naqishbund, sat on the selection board — and was himself a candidate. Officers who were passed over moved the Supreme Court under Articles 14 and 16 and for breach of natural justice.

1. Was the board's power judicial, quasi-judicial or purely administrative?
2. Does natural justice apply to an administrative selection?
3. Was Naqishbund's participation fatal, given that he withdrew when his own name was considered?

The selections were set aside.

The classification question. The petitioners said the power was judicial because rule 4 and regulation 5 spoke of adjudging suitability, which they said means "to judge or decide". The Attorney-General said it was purely administrative: the board decided no right, and adjudge here meant "found worthy of selection". The Court's answer is the sentence the case is remembered by: the dividing line is thin and being obliterated. Then the five factors:

"For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power, one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised."

Why the distinction is collapsing. The Court grounds it in the rule of law: "Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law." In a welfare State the jurisdiction of administrative bodies inevitably increases, and "The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner." Hence the redefinition: "The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously." Judicial procedures are not ends in themselves; they "are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision." Hence too the historical observation: "What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power", and the refusal to fix new limits: "It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power."

The technique to imitate. The Court did not decide the classification at all. It assumed the power was administrative "and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis", and struck them down anyway.

Natural justice in administrative enquiries. The old view was that unless the authority was required by its statute to act judicially there was no room for natural justice, and "The validity of that limitation is now questioned." The reasoning: "If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries", the more so since "An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have far more reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry."

Where natural justice sits in relation to statute. The rules "can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it." And what fairness requires varies: "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose."

Bias on the facts. "It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause." Naqishbund abstained when his own name was considered, but sat when his rivals' claims were considered and helped prepare the order of preference in which he stood first, so "To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice." The other members' affidavits that he had not influenced them were rejected: "In a group deliberation each member of the group is bound to influence the others", his bias "is likely to operate in a subtle manner", and "We are unable to believe that the members of selection board functioned like computers."

The line between administrative and quasi-judicial power is thin and being obliterated, and is drawn, where it must be drawn, by the five factors. Natural justice applies to administrative enquiries; the requirement of acting judicially is a requirement to act justly and fairly. A member of a selection board who is himself a candidate is a judge in his own cause, and abstention limited to his own case does not cure it.

• On classification of administrative action: the five factors verbatim, plus the proposition that the distinction survives to fix the measure of natural justice and not to decide whether it applies.
• On bias: with Ashok Kumar Yadav, which requires a related member of an ordinary selection committee to withdraw from the entire process, and prescribes three lesser safeguards for a constitutional body.
• On the scope of natural justice: with Ridge v Baldwin and State of Orissa v Binapani Dei, and with Maneka Gandhi, which completed the movement.