Say the ratio out loud before you open Reasoning — recalling it unprompted is exactly what the exam pays for.
Why it matters
The word "propagate" was the most debated word in Article 25 in the Constituent Assembly. This case gives it its settled meaning and locates the State's power to punish conversion by force, fraud or allurement in the entry on public order.
Facts
The Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968 and the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 prohibited conversion from one religion to another by the use of force, fraud or allurement and made it an offence. The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld its Act; the Orissa High Court struck down its Act as beyond the State's competence and as infringing Article 25. Appeals from both reached a Bench of five (Ray C.J., Beg, Sarkaria, Shingal and Jaswant Singh JJ.), which decided them on 17 January 1977.
Issues
- Does the right to "propagate" religion in Article 25(1) include a right to convert another person to one's own religion?
- Do the Acts fall within the State List entry on public order, or within the residuary entry of the Union List as laws on religion?
Held
Propagate. Counsel argued "that the right to 'propagate' one's religion means the right to convert a person to one's own religion" and that the right to convert is a fundamental right. The Court rejected the argument. "The word 'propogate' has been used in the Article as meaning to transmit or spread from person to person or from place to place. The Article does not grant right to convert other person to one's own religion but to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets. The freedom of religion enshrined in Art. 25 is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only but covers all religions alike which can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following other religion. What is freedom for one is freedom for the other in equal measure and there can, therefore, be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one's own religion."
Public order. Forcible conversion "would in all probability give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order affecting the community at large", so the Acts fall within Entry 1 of List II as laws "meant to avoid" "disturbance to the public order by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community. The two Acts do not provide for the regulation of religion and do not fall under Entry 97 of List I."
Result. The Madhya Pradesh appeals were dismissed and the Orissa appeals allowed, the Orissa High Court's judgment being set aside; both Acts stood.
The ratio, stated for an answer
Article 25(1) guarantees the right to spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets, not a right to convert another; each person's freedom of conscience is the limit of every other person's freedom to propagate. Laws penalising conversion by force, fraud or allurement are laws for public order within the competence of the States, and they establish, rather than restrict, the equal freedom of religion.
Related cases in this unit
- Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (Supreme Court, 1954) — what "religion" protects
- Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala (Supreme Court, 1986) — the National Anthem case
- Seshammal v State of Tamil Nadu (Supreme Court, 1972) — the archaka's appointment is secular
- N. Adithayan v Travancore Devaswom Board (Supreme Court, 2002) — caste is no qualification for the priesthood
- Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (Supreme Court, 2004) — the Ananda Marga Tandava case
- Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala (Supreme Court, 2018) — the Sabarimala case