Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (Supreme Court, 1954) — what "religion" protects

Every later religion case, Seshammal, Adithayan, Avadhuta, Sabarimala, applies the test stated here. The judgment also fixed the distinction between a tax and a fee that governs Article 27, and gave the definition of a "religious denomination" the Court still uses.

The Shirur Math is one of the eight maths at Udipi founded by Madhwacharya. Its head, the Swamiar, was faced with a scheme which the Commissioner proposed to settle for the Math under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. He petitioned the Madras High Court under Article 226 for a writ of prohibition, contending that the Act's provisions on the framing of a scheme and on the control of the Math's affairs interfered with the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f), 25 and 26, and that the annual contribution levied by section 76 was a tax beyond the State's competence and offended Article 27. The High Court granted the writ; the Commissioner appealed. A Bench of seven (Mahajan C.J., Mukherjea, S.R. Das, Bose, Ghulam Hasan, Bhagwati and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ.) heard the appeal; Mukherjea J. delivered the judgment on 16 April 1954.

1. Does "religion" in Articles 25 and 26 cover practices and rituals, or belief alone; and who decides what is essential to a religion?
2. Which provisions of the Act encroach on the freedom of religion and the denomination's right to manage its affairs?
3. Is the contribution under section 76 a tax or a fee, and does it offend Article 27?

Religion includes practice. The Court rejected the contention that religion is confined to matters of doctrine and belief and that "all secular activities, which may be associated with religion but do not really constitute an essential part of it, are amenable to State regulation": "The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be supported. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or ablations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would" not make them secular. Article 25(2)(a) permits regulation of economic, commercial or political activities associated with religious practice, not of the practice itself.

The Act. Several provisions of the Act, which let the Commissioner interfere with the Mathadhipati's management of the Math and its religious affairs, were held ultra vires Articles 19(1)(f), 25 and 26; the rest of the Act, being regulation of the administration of property, stood.

Tax, fee and Article 27. "Section 76(1) of the Act is void as the provision relating to the payment of annual contribution contained in it is a tax and not a fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras State Legislature to enact such a provision." But Article 27 was not offended: "the imposition under a. 76(1) of the Act, although it is a tax, does not come within the latter part of art. 27 because the object of the contribution under the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or any denomination under it but the proper administration of religious trusts and institutions wherever they exist."

Religion under Articles 25 and 26 covers belief and the practices, rituals and ceremonies that the religion's own doctrines treat as essential; the State may regulate the secular activities associated with religion and the administration of religious property, but not the essential practices themselves. A compulsory levy for the secular administration of religious institutions generally is not a tax "for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion" within Article 27, though it may fail for want of legislative competence if it is a tax rather than a fee.