S. N. Mukherjee v Union of India (1990)

It is the case that settles that the duty to record reasons is a principle of natural justice, and it settles it in the form to memorise: the duty governs every administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, whether or not the decision is appealable, except where it has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication.

The appellant, subject to the Army Act 1950, was tried by General Court Martial on three charges, acquitted on the second and convicted on the first and third, and dismissed from service. The Chief of the Army Staff confirmed the findings and sentence; the Central Government rejected his post-confirmation petition under section 164(2). Neither gave reasons.

"The appeal involves the question as to whether it was incumbent for the Chief of the Army Staff, while confirming the findings and the sentence of the General Court Martial, and for the Central Government, while rejecting the post-confirmation petition of the appellant, to record their reasons for the orders passed by them."

The requirement to record reasons is one of the principles of natural justice governing the exercise of power by administrative authorities, but it may be excluded expressly or by necessary implication.

What recording reasons achieves. It "serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making." Facilitating appellate or supervisory review is only one benefit among several, and "The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review." Hence the requirement "should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review."

How much reason is enough. "it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy." Two practical rules follow: "The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage", and an appellate or revisional authority affirming such an order "need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge."

Reasons as a principle of natural justice. The Donoughmore Committee had argued "that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial", observing that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair" even where the decision is final, and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity". Wade adds that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice". Siemens Engineering Co. had already held that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process". That rests on the premise that the two classical rules are not exhaustive — which is what Kraipak said when it recorded that "Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged" and that "in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice."

The Court's conclusion. "Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities."

But it may be excluded. "The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority." The legislature may dispense with the requirement expressly — the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 of the United States and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 of Australia are the examples given — or by necessary implication "from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment." Where it does, "The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons."

The rule, in the form to memorise. "except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision."

A subsidiary point. On the authority of Som Datt Datta v Union of India, a person aggrieved by a court-martial finding "has no right to make a representation before the confirmation of the same by the confirming authority", but if one is in fact made "it is expected that the confirming authority shall give due consideration to the same". On the facts the appellant's representation never reached the confirming authority "due to some communication gap within the department", and because there was no legal right to make it at that stage, "the non-consideration of the same by the confirming authority before the passing of the order of confirmation would not vitiate the said order."

Recording reasons is a principle of natural justice binding on an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review, unless the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication.

• On reasoned decisions: this and M. J. Sivani are the whole answer, with Sunil Batra as the illustration of the duty being spelt out of a silent statute.
• On the growth of natural justice: with Kraipak on subsidiary rules and ECIL v Karunakar on the supply of the inquiry report. Say that the list keeps growing, and that every extension carries a matching limit.