State of Karnataka v Union of India (1977)

The Union Government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into corruption charges against a sitting Chief Minister of a State. The State sued the Union, arguing among other things that only the State Legislature could inquire into the conduct of its members and Ministers, as part of its privileges under Art. 194(3).

The Court rejected that argument and upheld the Central Commission. For Unit 2 the case matters because of what it says about legislative privilege: the "powers, privileges and immunities" of a House under Art. 194(3) are those needed for the conduct of the House's own business; they do not put Ministers beyond the ordinary law, and questions about where those privileges end are for the ordinary courts. It is one of the decisions later gathered up and restated in Raja Ram Pal v Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007), alongside the Special Reference in Keshav Singh.

It is also a leading case on Art. 131 — which disputes a State may bring against the Union — and on Beg CJ's account of federalism and the basic structure.

Opposition members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly submitted a memorandum to the Union Home Minister alleging corruption, favouritism and nepotism against the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister called the allegations frivolous and politically motivated.

On 18 May 1977 the State Government itself appointed a one-man commission under s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952, presided over by a retired Judge of the Karnataka High Court, to inquire into specified allegations. On 23 May 1977 the Government of India appointed its own one-man commission under the same section, presided over by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, to inquire into charges against the Chief Minister, excluding any matter covered by the State's notification.

The State filed a suit under Art. 131. Three issues were framed: (1) Is the suit maintainable? (2) Is the Central notification ultra vires s. 3 of the Act? (3) If it is within s. 3, is the section itself unconstitutional?

1. Is a suit by the State under Art. 131 maintainable where the Union's action is directed at the State's Ministers?
2. Does the Central notification cover "the same matter" as the State's, so as to be barred by proviso (b) to s. 3(1)?
3. Can the Centre, under s. 3, appoint a Commission to inquire into the conduct of sitting State Ministers — or does that offend the federal structure, collective responsibility under Art. 164(2), or the privileges of the State Legislature under Art. 194(3)?
4. Did Parliament have legislative competence to enact s. 3 so as to cover such inquiries?

"In accordance with the view of the majority, the Suit is dismissed with costs."

The Judges divided differently on different issues:

• Maintainability: held maintainable by Beg CJ, Chandrachud, Bhagwati and Kailasam JJ; Untwalia, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh JJ dissented and held the suit not maintainable.
• Merits: six Judges held the Central notification and s. 3 valid. Kailasam J dissented on the merits: he held the notification beyond the Centre's powers under s. 3 and would have decreed the suit as prayed for.

Art. 194(3) — legislative privilege

The State argued that by virtue of Art. 194(3) only the Assembly could inquire into the conduct of its members. Beg CJ called this "a somewhat desperate attempt to find some constitutional prohibition against the inquiries". He held that Arts. 105 and 194 do not deal with legislative power at all; they cover the powers each House exercises as a House. Such powers "cannot also be expanded into those of the House of Commons in England for all purposes."

On the idea that Ministers answerable to the Legislature are under a separate law: "Now, what learned counsel for the plaintiff seemed to suggest was that Ministers, answerable to a Legislature were governed by a separate law which exempted them from liabilities under the ordinary law. This was never the law in England. And, it is not so here."

A House may proceed quasi-judicially in contempt and privilege matters to remove obstructions to its legislative functions; "But, if any question of jurisdiction arises as to whether a matter falls here or not, it has to be decided by the ordinary courts in appropriate proceedings."

Chandrachud J put the holding shortly: "in the absence of a specific provision in the Constitution that the conduct of a member of the legislature shall be inquired into by the legislature only, it is impossible to hold that the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry under the Act constitutes an interference with the privilege of the legislature." And: "English precedents relating to the privileges of the House of Commons, which are relevant under article 194(3), do not support the State's contention."

Collective responsibility

Collective responsibility under Art. 164(2) does not shield an individual Minister from inquiry. Per Chandrachud J, if an individual Minister uses his office as an occasion or pretence for corruption, "he would be personally answerable for his unlawful acts", and no question of the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers arises.

The two notifications were not on "the same matter"

The State's commission looked at irregularities and excess payments; the Central one was directed at whether the Chief Minister practised favouritism and nepotism. Their objects differed, so proviso (b) to s. 3(1) did not bar the Central inquiry.

Validity of s. 3

Parliament was competent under List I Entry 94, List III Entry 45 and, failing those, the residuary power in Art. 248 read with List I Entry 97. Beg CJ refused to read s. 3 down: "To do so would be to give an incentive to possible misuse and perversion of governmental machinery and powers for objects not warranted by law." Such powers "are to be exercised like the powers and obligations of trustees who must not deviate from the purposes of their trusts."

Art. 131 — Bhagwati J

On maintainability, Bhagwati J held that the plaintiff need not assert a legal right of its own: "It is not a sine qua non of the applicability of article 131 that there should be infringement of some legal right of the plaintiff." The legal right in dispute "may be of the plaintiff or of the defendant".

1. The "powers, privileges and immunities" of a House of a State Legislature under Art. 194(3) are those of the House functioning as a House, for the conduct of its business; they are not legislative powers and do not exempt Ministers from the ordinary law. In the absence of a specific constitutional provision reserving to the Legislature inquiry into its members' conduct, a Commission of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 does not infringe the Legislature's privileges. Where a question arises whether a matter falls within privilege, the ordinary courts decide it.
2. Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1952 empowers the Central Government to appoint a Commission to inquire into allegations of corruption against a sitting Chief Minister or State Ministers, and is within Parliament's legislative competence.
3. (By majority) A State may sue the Union under Art. 131 where the dispute involves the existence or extent of a legal right, whether of the plaintiff or of the defendant.

• Privileges question: Discuss the scope of the powers, privileges and immunities of a State Legislature under Article 194(3). Can a Legislature claim exclusive power to inquire into the conduct of its members? Use this case for the answer no, and for the point that the ordinary courts decide the limits of privilege; then show how Raja Ram Pal gathers this case up with Keshav Singh.
• Centre–State relations: Can the Union appoint a Commission of Inquiry against a sitting Chief Minister? Yes — s. 3 of the 1952 Act, competence under Entry 94/Entry 45/Entry 97; not barred by collective responsibility or privilege. Mention Kailasam J's dissent.
• Art. 131: What disputes may be brought under Article 131? Use Bhagwati J — the legal right in issue may be the plaintiff's or the defendant's — and contrast Untwalia J's dissent on maintainability.