Crawley v. Issacs

It disposes of the commonest answer to a natural-justice objection — but that is how they do it there. The forum's standard is not the foreign court's own practice.

This course cites the case for Bramwell J.'s proposition and does not set out its facts. The situation addressed is a foreign proceeding conducted in accordance with the practice of the foreign court.

If the proceedings are in accordance with the practice of the foreign court, but that practice is not in accordance with justice, the forum will not allow itself to be concluded by them.

Step one — fix what the objection is about. The expression contrary to natural justice relates merely to alleged irregularities in the procedure adopted by the adjudicating court, and has nothing to do with the merits of the case.

Step two — fix what it is not about. A judgment is not against natural justice merely because it is manifestly wrong, nor because the foreign court admitted evidence that would be inadmissible in the forum. Those are complaints about the decision and about foreign rules of evidence, and neither is a breach of natural justice.

Step three — identify the substance of the requirement. It is audi alteram partem, deemed to be of universal and not merely domestic application, and the classic instance of its breach is a mode of citation manifestly insufficient as judged by any civilised standard.

Step four — hence local practice is no answer. If conformity with the foreign court's own practice sufficed, the guarantee would be worthless in exactly the system where it is needed.

It opens: When is a foreign judgment refused recognition as opposed to natural justice?

Write the answer as a set of exclusions, then the core. Not merits, not error, not foreign rules of evidence, not local practice — and then the one thing that counts, a real failure to give the party notice and a hearing.

Connect it to the Indian clause. Section 13(d) makes conclusiveness fail where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice, and the clause is read the same way: it is about procedure, not outcome. Keep it distinct from s. 13(b), which asks whether the judgment was given on the merits, and where the inquiry is confined to seeing that the foreign court applied its mind to the facts and the law — Mallappa Yellappa v. Raghavendra.

Note where the two clauses meet. In D.T. Kaymer v. P. Viswanathan the defence was struck out for failure to answer interrogatories and judgment passed; the Privy Council held the merits had not been investigated. The same facts could be argued under either clause, and a good answer says which and why.

It does not decide that the forum imposes its own procedural code on foreign courts; the standard is justice, not similarity.