Som Datt Datta v Union of India (1969)

For the duty to give reasons, and for the honest reason that this case says there is no general duty.

The petitioner argued that a confirming authority and the Central Government, dealing with the findings of a court-martial, must give reasons. The Court held that neither the Army Act nor any rule imposed such an obligation, and — the wider proposition — that there is no general principle or rule of natural justice requiring a statutory tribunal always to give reasons.

That position has been substantially eroded since, and a good answer says so: Siemens Engineering v Union of India (1976) treated reasons as an essential requirement of natural justice in quasi-judicial proceedings, and later cases have made a reasoned order the norm. But Som Datt Datta remains the starting point and the case the later ones argue with, so you must be able to state it accurately before criticising it.

The petitioner was a Second Lieutenant in the army. On 1 September 1965 he was involved in a quarrel between two groups of soldiers which led to an altercation, the stabbing and death of a soldier.

On 2 September 1965 the matter was reported to the civil police. The Inspector of Police inspected the place of occurrence, seized exhibits produced by an army officer, held an inquest and sent the body for post-mortem. Later the same day he stopped further investigation, the army officer in charge wanting the case handled by the military authorities.

Also on 2 September a Court of Inquiry under Chapter VI of the Army Rules was ordered by the area Commander. After it concluded, a Court Martial was constituted on 11 August 1966 by the General Officer Commanding.

The Court Martial found the petitioner guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and of being a member of an unlawful assembly, and sentenced him to cashiering and six years' rigorous imprisonment. His petition under s. 164 was dismissed by the confirming authority, which confirmed the finding and sentence; his appeal to the Central Government under s. 165 was also dismissed.

He petitioned under Article 32 for certiorari to quash the court-martial proceedings, arguing that the Court Martial lacked jurisdiction given s. 125 and the initial reference to the civil police; that no notice had been given under Rule 5; and that no reasons had been given in support of the orders under ss. 164 and 165.

Petition dismissed.

(i) Jurisdiction. "Merely because the First Information Report was lodged with the civil police on September 2 and the Inspector of Police inspected the place of occurrence, seized certain exhibits and held an inquest on the body of the deceased, it could not reasonably be said that there was a decision of the competent military authority under s. 125 of the Army Act to hand over the inquiry to the criminal court." On the contrary, the General Officer Commanding — the competent authority under s. 125 — constituted the Court of Inquiry on 2 September, which "indicates that there was a decision taken under s. 125 that the proceedings should be instituted before the Court-Martial."

(ii) The rules were not attracted. Rule 3 under s. 549 CrPC "only applies to a case where the police has completed the investigation and the accused is brought before the Magistrate after submission of a charge-sheet", and could not be invoked where the police "had merely started investigation against a person subject to military law." Further, Regulation 527 of the Defence Services Regulations "itself provides that in cases of unnatural death, information should be given under s. 174 Criminal Procedure Code to the civil authorities", so the officer's action in informing the police "was merely in accordance with the provisions of this particular Regulation."

(iii) The charge. There was no need to amend under Rule 50(2), "because that sub-rule only relates to an alteration of charge before the examination of witnesses", and Rule 121(4) was not attracted; the finding was justified given the language of s. 139(6).

(iv) Reasons — the important holding.

"There is no express obligation imposed by s. 164 or by s. 165 of the Army Act on the confirming authority or upon the Central Government to give reasons in support of its decision to confirm the proceedings of the Court-Martial. No other Section of the Act or any Rule had been shown from which a necessary implication could be drawn that such a duty is cast upon the Central Government or upon the confirming authority. Furthermore, there was no force in the contention that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision."

Rex v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1952] 1 KB 338 was considered.

Neither the Army Act nor any rule obliges the confirming authority or the Central Government to give reasons for confirming a court-martial, and there is no general rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal must give reasons in every case.

• Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co v Union of India (1976) held that recording reasons is an essential requirement where an authority acts quasi-judicially, and that the rule of natural justice requires a speaking order.
• Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) strengthened the fairness requirement generally.
• S.N. Mukherjee v Union of India (1990), a Constitution Bench — and itself a court-martial confirmation case — settled the modern position: reasons must ordinarily be recorded, with limited exceptions. Read it against Som Datt Datta; the pair shows the whole movement of Indian administrative law on this point.

• Direct question: Is there a duty to give reasons for an administrative or quasi-judicial decision? Begin with Som Datt Datta as the older position, then Siemens Engineering and S.N. Mukherjee for the modern rule, and conclude that reasons are now the norm.
• Problem question pattern: an authority confirms a penalty in a one-line order. Under current law that is ordinarily bad for want of reasons — but say what the position was, and why it changed.
• Point of technique: note the two steps in the Court's reasoning on reasons — no express obligation, and no necessary implication from the rest of the statute. That is how a court tests an implied duty, and the method is reusable.
• Facts worth remembering: a court-martial for a killing during a quarrel between soldiers, with a first report to the civil police that did not oust military jurisdiction.